TEN YEARS OF COURT-SUPERVISED REFORM:
A CHRONICLE AND ASSESSMENT
James B. Jacobs
and Kristin Stohner
Cite as 6 Cal. Crim. Law Rev. 3
Pincite using paragraph numbers,
e.g. 6 Cal. Crim. Law Rev. 3, ¶11
II. The Case Study: The New York City District Council of Carpenters
B. The 1990 Civil RICO Suit and Settlement
1. The Suit
2. The Settlement
C. Implementing the Consent Decree
1. The Local 17 Trusteeship
2. The Javits Center Investigation
3. The 1995 District Council Election
4. Other Investigations
5. UBC International's Trusteeship over,
and Restructuring of, the District Council
6. Terminating the IRO and the UBC Trusteeship
A. The Necessity and Difficulty of Evaluation
B. Successes and Failures
IV. Conclusion: The Need for Further Documentation and Analysis
the Newark (federal) Organized Crime Strike Force brought the first civil RICO
suit against an organized-crime dominated union in 1982,
the Department of Justice has brought approximately twenty more suits against
mobbed-up locals, district councils, and international unions.
The government has prevailed in each of these suits, usually by means of
a negotiated settlement that results in a court-appointed trustee designated to
purge organized crime’s influence from the union and restore union democracy.
Taken together, these suits may constitute the most ambitious effort at
government-sponsored court-supervised organizational change in U.S. history.
They also provide an important test of the effectiveness of a new form of
non-traditional law enforcement that relies on civil remedies rather than on
prosecutions. Strangely, however, this massive legal effort has attracted
little attention from labor law or criminal law scholars.
Consequently, we know practically nothing about what works and what does
not work in reforming mobbed-up unions. This
article seeks to begin documentation and analysis of this extraordinary chapter
in U.S. labor and law enforcement history through a case study of one large
organized crime-controlled union, the New York City
District Council of Carpenters (“District Council”).
crime penetrated the District Council through the District Council’s some two
dozen constituent locals, several of which have documented histories of
organized crime infiltration and even domination.
What is also noteworthy is that at least four La Cosa Nostra (LCN)
organized crime families (Colombo; DeCavalcante; Gambino; Genovese) have exerted
influence over the District Council’s local affiliates.
In the early 1970s, Genovese capo Pete DeFeo and his lieutenant,
Alexander Morrelli, represented the Genovese Family’s interest in the District
Council. By the late 1970s,
the Genovese Family’s interest in the District Council was represented and
expanded by Vincent DiNapoli, a capo in the crime family and a powerful figure
in the drywall industry.
1976, Danny Evangelista was shot to death while sitting at his desk at Local 385
headquarters. Evangelista had
opposed Genovese candidate Theodore Maritas’ candidacy for the District
In 1978, Willie Nordstrom, president of Local 488, was shot to death.
Nordstrom was a “dissident” who vociferously criticized the union’s
leadership. In 1981, the home of
Shaun Toner was firebombed. Toner
was an open critic of the officers of Local 17 and of the District Council.
In July 1984, Gaetano Macaluso was attacked with an iron pipe.
Macaluso was a dissident in Local 531.
In 1988, Genovese Family associates beat up Marcello Svedese, treasurer
of Local 17.
In 1989, Thomas Maikowsi, who opposed Edward Walaski’s candidacy for
business agent of Local 531, was stabbed outside a union nominating meeting.
FBI’s and U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) crackdown on organized
crime resulted in convictions of a number of Carpenter Union officials and
organized crime figures, including those in Table I of the Appendix.
In 1986, the President’s Commission on Organized Crime concluded that
LCN exerted pervasive influence over the District Council.
In 1987, John O’Connor, a top official in Local 608, one of the
District Council’s constituent locals, was indicted on 127 counts of bribery
He was convicted in 1990 of a lesser number of labor bribery counts and
was sentenced to one to three years in prison.
In 1988, Vinnie “The Fish” Cafaro, a member of the Genovese Crime
Family who became a government cooperating witness, told the U.S. Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations that the Genovese Family controlled the
1990, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, brought a civil
RICO suit against the officers of the District Council and organized crime
figures who allegedly exerted influence on the District Council.
In addition to broad discovery opportunities and a lower burden of proof,
one great advantage of the civil RICO suit was the possibility of obtaining
wide-ranging equitable relief, including a court-appointed trustee empowered to
reform the union.
The civil RICO complaint against the District Council alleged that the
union was being run on behalf of organized crime.
It described the manner in which the District Council was dominated by
the Genovese Crime Family and the large profits that LCN derived from illegal
payoffs for labor peace. It
asserted that “[c]orrupt officers have systematically traded the union
members’ contractual rights in return for the officers’ personal gain” and
that “economic coercion, threats, violence and the known ties between union
officers and organized crime” silenced the opposition of the rank and file to
such an extent that “the members have been deprived of their right to
participate in and control their union.”
suit was resolved by a settlement providing for a court-appointed trusteeship
over the union.
For almost six years, the trustee (known as the Investigative Reporting
Officer) investigated the District Council, brought disciplinary charges against
mob-associated members, sought to reform the hiring hall, and conducted the
first rank and file election in District Council history.
In 1999, the court found that the trusteeship had succeeded and restored
the union to self-governance. However,
a number of investigations and criminal prosecutions since then suggest that the
District Council continues to be plagued by corruption and racketeering.
¶7Part II of this
article provides a background on the nature, depth, and extent of racketeering
in the District Council. It also
examines in detail the civil RICO suit, the consent decree, and the trustee’s
efforts to reform the union. Part
III analyzes the successes and failures of the court-appointed trusteeship over
the District Council. Furthermore,
it draws some lessons about the potential and limits of court-supervised
strategies for reforming corrupted organizations generally.
Part IV concludes this article by suggesting future actions necessary to
reform the District Council fully and by highlighting the need for further
documentation and analysis of this subject matter.
The Case Study: The New York City District Council of
Brotherhood of Carpenters (UBC) International Union, headquartered in
Washington, D.C., has approximately 520,000 members in the U.S. and Canada.
Its Constitution requires a regional (“district”) council whenever
two or more locals exist in the same locality.
Each district council has its own by-laws, officers, treasury and
jurisdiction over contracts, grievances, and benefit funds.
The affiliated local unions elect delegates to the district council in
proportion to the size of their memberships.
District Council, located in Manhattan, is one of New York City’s largest
unions, representing approximately 30,000 members.
At the time the U.S. Attorney’s Office brought the 1990 civil RICO
suit, the District Council negotiated, implemented, and enforced collective
bargaining agreements, and handled disputes, grievances and arbitrations on
behalf of 22 local unions.
District Council’s collective bargaining agreements require employers to make
contributions on behalf of their union-member employees to pension and welfare
funds. While these funds are
governed by an equal number of employer-appointed and union-appointed trustees,
in reality, the District Council controls and administers these funds.
These funds include: the New
York City District Council of Carpenters’ Pension Fund; Welfare Fund; Vacation
Fund; Annuity Fund; Apprenticeship, Journeyman Retraining, Educational and
Industry Fund; Supplemental Fund; and the Retirement and Pension Plan Fund.
These funds are worth hundreds of millions of dollars and are attractive
targets for racketeers.
the 1990 civil RICO settlement was implemented, all District Council officers
also served as officers in their home locals.
For example, Frederick Devine, president of the District Council
(1991-96), also served as president of Local 1456.
John Abbatemarco, the District Council’s first vice president, also
served as Local 257’s vice president.
Genovese Crime Family controlled the District Council through its capo, Vincent
DiNapoli. According to the FBI,
Teddy Maritas, District Council president from 1977 to 1981, was a Genovese
Crime Family associate. Eventually, Maritas disappeared.
Presumably, he was murdered because the organized crime bosses suspected
that he was cooperating with federal prosecutors. Thereafter, the mob continued its control over the District
Council through Paschal McGuinness, president from 1982 to 1991, and then Fred
Devine, president from 1991 to 1996.
Genovese Family maintained its grip on the District Council by intimidation and
violence and by its control over carpenters’ job opportunities.
Because construction work is
usually short term, carpenters often depend upon their union to get them jobs.
Since collective bargaining agreements require contractors to call the
union’s hiring hall when they have a construction contract to perform, the
union can blackball “troublemakers” and reward loyal supporters through its
control of choice job assignments.
many years, the Genovese Crime Family used the District Council to create and
maintain a drywall cartel.
The union could thwart uncooperative contractors (who failed to pay off
organized crime) from performing their contracts by assigning incompetent
workers, calling strikes and slowdowns, picketing, or otherwise sabotaging the
worksite. What is more, the cartel rigged bids, allocated contracts,
and fixed prices.
the early 1980s, a federal RICO prosecution of Maritas, DiNapoli and others
based on the drywall cartel resulted in a mistrial.
The jury hung 10-1 for conviction.
On the evening before the
scheduled retrial in March 1982, Maritas disappeared.
DiNapoli plead guilty. While
DiNapoli served a five year prison term, his brother, Louis, represented the
Genovese Crime Family’s interest in the District Council.
Soon after DiNapoli’s release from prison, he was tried and convicted
in the “Commission case,” and this time he was sentenced to one hundred
years in prison.
International placed the District Council under trusteeship.
Allegedly with organized crime’s blessing, Pat Campbell was appointed
He reorganized the New York City locals.
For example, he merged four locals to create Local 17 and purposefully or
inadvertently consolidated the Genovese Family’s influence over jobs in upper
Manhattan and the Bronx.
Campbell also chose Local 608 president Paschal McGuinness, a Genovese
Crime Family associate, to be the new District Council president.
McGuinness placed John O’Connor in charge of the District Council’s daily
operations. O’Connor was subsequently charged with 127 counts of racketeering,
and, in 1990, he pled guilty to receiving a bribe from an employer.
He was sentenced to one to three years in prison and fined $25,000.
and corruption flourished under McGuinness’s presidency.
According to the U.S. Attorney, when the Javits Exhibition Center opened
in Manhattan in 1986, McGuinness gave preference to Genovese Family associates
for high paying and desirable Center jobs.
Six out of ten violent acts, which were later cited as predicate offenses
in the 1990 civil RICO suit, occurred during McGuinness’ presidency, including
an assault with an iron pipe against a dissident member at a job site and the
non-fatal shooting of John O’Connor.
Further, McGuinness himself allegedly committed seven of the racketeering
acts listed in the civil RICO complaint. All
involved bribery. In a deposition,
Marcello Svedese, a District Council officer from 1981 to 1989 and a cooperating
government witness, explained McGuinness’ ties with organized crime:
have known Paschal McGuinness to associate with various organized crime figures
in connection with the District Council. I
was present at a meeting between McGuinness and Louis DiNapoli, a made member of
the Genovese Family, and I have discussed organized crime and the District
Council with McGuiness on many occasions.
1990 Civil RICO Suit and Settlement
1990, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, filed a civil
RICO complaint against the
District Council, its former and current officers, and six LCN figures.
The complaint named the District Council, its constituent local unions,
and its benefit funds as the RICO enterprise.
It alleged two separate RICO violations:
(1) that the LCN defendants, aided and abetted by past and present
District Council officers, violated RICO by acquiring an interest in and control
over the union through a pattern of racketeering activity,
and (2) that the defendants participated in the affairs of the union through a
pattern of racketeering activity.
first RICO charge alleged that “the defendants . . . unlawfully . . .
affect[ed] commerce . . . by extortion . . . in that they obtained and attempted
to obtain property.”
The “property” that the defendants allegedly “obtained and
attempted to obtain” included the union members’ Landrum-Griffin-guaranteed
rights, such as the right to elect officials and the right to free speech.
In other words, the government alleged that LCN labor racketeers and
union officials committed Hobbs Act extortion when union members were forced,
through violence and intimidation, to surrender their rights to union democracy.
The complaint listed 54 predicate acts that constituted a pattern of
racketeering activity and contributed to a climate of intimidation and fear
among the rank and file members of the District Council, thereby enabling the
defendants to acquire an interest in the union.
These acts included murders;
assaults with firebombs, iron pipes, brute force, knives and guns;
appointments to union leadership positions of inexperienced, incompetent and
union officials’ associations with known organized crime members;
the defendant union officers’ failure to take action to rid the union of
corruption; and abuse of union
office. The government also
charged the defendants with conspiracy to violate RICO § 1962(b).
second RICO charge was based upon § 1962(c) (participating in the affairs of an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity) and it cited 54 predicate
illegal labor payments,
mail fraud, and unlawful welfare
The government also alleged that the defendants were guilty of violating
§ 1962(d) by conspiring to violate § 1962(c).
government sought preliminary and permanent injunctions (1) to prohibit
organized crime defendants Anthony Salerno, Vincent DiNapoli, Louis DiNapoli,
Peter DeFeo, Alexander Morelli, Liborio Bellomo and all others in active concert
or participation with them from having contact with the District Council or any
other labor organization; (2) to enjoin current, former and future officers of
the District Council and those participating with them from committing any acts
of racketeering activity
and from associating with any member or associate of LCN; (3) to appoint a court
liaison officer to have all necessary authority to prevent racketeering activity and to ensure union
democracy; (4) to enjoin all members and officers from interfering with the
court liaison officer’s execution of her duties; and (5) to grant the
government further preliminary relief as is necessary.
The government also sought a court-implemented election of District
trial began on September 13, 1993 and continued through October 18, 1993, when
it was temporarily recessed.
In March 1994, the parties
reached a settlement, the terms of which are manifested in a consent decree.
The U.S. Attorney agreed to drop the civil RICO complaint in
exchange for significant District Council reforms designed to purge organized
crime and promote union democracy. The
parties agreed that the consent decree’s dominant purpose was to ensure a
democratic union and, toward that end, that there should not be any criminal
element or LCN corruption in the District Council and its constituent locals.
All union officers were permanently enjoined from:
(a) committing any act of racketeering activity as defined by the RICO
statute; (b) knowingly associating with any member or associate of any LCN crime
family or any other criminal group, or with any person prohibited from
participating in union affairs; and (c) obstructing or otherwise improperly
interfering with the court-appointed officer’s efforts to enforce the consent
parties agreed that the consent decree would be implemented by a court-appointed
Investigations and Review Officer (“IRO”) and a five person “Independent
Hearing Committee” (“IHC”).
The consent decree named former Federal District Court Judge Kenneth
as the IRO and five individuals as the IHC.
The District Council would pay $65,000 each month to cover the
compensation and expenses of the IRO and the IHC.
If the IRO’s expenses exceeded $65,000, UBC International would
contribute up to an additional $15,000.
IRO’s powers included: investigating
District Council operations and individuals; bringing disciplinary charges;
exercising veto authority over officer decisions; recommending organizational
reforms; formulating and implementing new job referral rules; and organizing and
supervising the District Council’s 1995 elections.
The IRO’s decisions would be final and binding unless the court found
them to be arbitrary and capricious.
The IRO’s term of office was set at 30 months, renewable by the court
for up to an additional six months upon a showing of good cause.
The IRO’s supervisory authority over elections would terminate after
certification of the 1995 election results.
IRO could initiate a disciplinary action against a union officer or member by
serving a written and specific charge on that person.
Within a week after service of the charge, a panel composed of three IHC
members would be selected. The IRO
would choose one panel member, the charged party would choose another, and the
two members would choose the third member.
A hearing would be conducted within 30 to 60 days according to the rules
and procedures applicable to labor arbitration hearings.
order to “eliminate the corruption, favoritism and cronyism that existed under
the old system,”
the consent agreement further required that within 30 days each local union
within the District Council implement new job referral rules.
These new rules had to include: non-discriminatory and non-exclusive
job referrals; a method of registering members’ availability for job referral;
a procedure that refers jobs to members whose names have been on the waiting
list the longest; effective dissemination of the job referral rules; maintenance
of accurate job referral records; and member access to job referral information.
consent decree ended the long-time practice of union officials drawing two
salaries—one as an officer of their local and one as an officer of the
The decree also required the District Council, for a period of seven
years, to give prior written notice to the government and to the IRO of changes
in any rules or procedures adopted or implemented pursuant to the consent
consent decree authorized the IRO to implement and supervise the first rank and
file election of District Council officers in that union’s history.
Toward that end, IRO Conboy would draft rules for conducting a
secret-ballot election, including guidelines for “nomination of candidates,
dissemination of information about nominated candidates to the membership at
union expense, and the conduct of the final secret ballot election.”
Additionally, the consent decree empowered the IRO to hire or designate
other persons or entities to assist in carrying out the rules, to resolve all election
disputes, and to certify the election results.
summarize, the consent decree empowered the IRO:
to initiate and serve disciplinary charges against any member of the
District Council and its constituent locals for any matter constituting an
offense under any applicable law, union constitution, by-law, working rule or
to take such reasonable steps as are lawful and necessary to be fully
informed about the activities of the District Council;
to study the operations of the District Council and its locals and
recommend changes to improve those operations (including but not limited to the
procedures used to investigate and discipline misconduct and those used to fill
vacancies in union offices);
to supervise the adoption, implementation and operation of the job
to supervise all phases of a secret ballot election of the District
Council Executive Board scheduled for June 1995 and any special elections that
might occur before then;
to employ or engage the services of any personnel necessary to assist in
the proper discharge of the IRO’s duties.
the Consent Decree
Conboy announced three basic objectives for the trusteeship:
to cleanse the union of corrupt individuals; to reform the job referral
system; and to conduct a direct rank and file election.
Recognizing the importance of obtaining rank and file support, he
addressed an open letter to the membership in the union’s newsletter, The
Carpenter, explaining his responsibilities and his goal of returning a
reformed union to the membership: “I hope to have your support and cooperation as I oversee
the enactment of these important reforms over the coming months.
I would also encourage any member to contact me . . . on an entirely
confidential basis, with any suggestions or information that would enable me to
perform my duties more effectively.”
Subsequently, the District Council sought to stop Conboy from publishing
in The Carpenter reports that cast the union’s officers in a bad light.
Judge Charles Haight ruled in Conboy’s favor.
new job referral rules referred union members to jobs according to the length of
their unemployment. Conboy and his
staff had to spend significant time attending local union meetings, answering
questions, and making necessary adjustments.
Five months after the rules were implemented, Conboy reported that
complaints about job referrals had decreased dramatically.
He stated that “the rules are generally being followed most of the
However, some locals, especially Local 17, continued an “informal system”
that referred the best jobs to favored members.
The Local 17 Trusteeship
17, the largest local in the District Council, was created by the 1981 merger of four local unions, ostensibly in order to resist corruption and
racketeering. Ironically, however,
organized crime had a strong presence in Local 17 from the outset.
In 1987, a jurisdictional dispute occurred between the two Genovese Crime
Family crews with influence over the District Council, Peter DeFeo’s crew, and
Liborio “Barney” Belommo’s crew.
The Genovese Family consigliere awarded Bellomo’s
crew “jurisdiction” over Local 17.
The June 1989 election generated a slate of candidates consisting of
Genovese Family associates. Enrico Ruotolo was elected business manager and, in 1992,
selected as Local 17’s delegate to the District Council.
The IRO’s investigation of Local 17 illuminated the local’s financial
crisis, frequent job rule violations, and links to organized crime.
Conboy filed disciplinary charges against Ruotolo, alleging that he
routinely associated with LCN members, lied about that fact in a deposition,
referred union members to a nonunion contractor, fired one union member,
threatened to move another union member to the bottom of the Local’s work list
in response to his recalcitrance, accepted a gift from a contractor, and
referred ineligible union members to jobs.
He also requested that UBC International impose a trusteeship over Local
general president complied in April 1995
and appointed a trustee whom Conboy found cooperative.
The Javits Center Investigation
“the Fish” Cafaro, a close ally of Genovese Crime Family’s acting boss
“Fat Tony” Salerno, stated in a deposition in 1990 that “the Genovese
crime family controlled the hiring of carpenters, first at the old exhibition
center, the New York Coliseum, and later at the new exhibition center, the
Javits Convention Center.”
In July 1994, Conboy began investigating LCN’s control over
carpenters’ jobs at the Javits Center.
He soon determined that Anthony Fiorino
and Lenard Simon, the two District Council officers who represented the District
Council at the Javits Center, filled all carpenter jobs at the Center from a
“pool list” of 100 carpenters.
An investigation revealed that more than half of the individuals on the
pool list had a criminal record, ties to organized crime, or both.
Fiorino and Simon were both associates of the Genovese Family; Fiorino
was Genovese Family acting boss Barney Bellomo’s brother-in-law and Simon was
Genovese Family capo
Ralph Coppola’s brother-in-law.
President Fred Devine, who himself had been linked to the Colombo Family,
appointed Fiorino and Simon to their positions.
September 1994, Conboy attempted to implement a non-discriminatory job referral
system that would fairly assign Javits Center jobs.
Fiorino and Simon, with Devine’s support, opposed Conboy’s plan.
They proposed instead that the collective bargaining agreement be amended
to insulate the pool list from the job referral rules.
Devine refused Conboy’s demand to replace Fiorino and Simon.
After some fruitless efforts at dispute settlement, Devine wrote a letter
to Conboy cutting off negotiations.
October 1994, Simon resigned his position as head of carpenters at the Javits
Center, but he remained there as a highly paid shop steward.
Conboy served Simon with notice of disciplinary charges alleging that he
brought discredit to the union by using a pool list, allowing non-union-members
to work at the Center, submitting a false application to the UBJCA, and
receiving compensation from an employer in violation of the Taft-Hartley Act.
These charges led Simon to resign from the union.
December 1994, Conboy filed disciplinary charges against Fiorino, alleging eight
violations of the UBC’s Standards of Conduct, including:
knowingly associating with members of the Genovese Crime Family,
discriminating against rank and file members,
threatening a union member with physical harm, acting on behalf of a contractor
seeking to hire non-union members, participating in a labor bribery scheme,
allowing suspended men to work at the Javits Center, falsely representing his
own qualifications as a carpenter when applying for union membership, and
violating the District Council bylaw against invoking the Fifth Amendment before
a committee of investigation.
The IHC panel that presided over the disciplinary hearings found most of
the charges proved and decided that Fiorino should be expelled from the union
Judge Haight affirmed.
light of the District Council’s and Devine’s unwillingness to reform job
referrals at the Javits Center, Conboy filed an application with Judge Haight
seeking an order to: (1) invalidate
portions of the collective bargaining agreement governing District Council job
referrals in the trade show industry and the manner by which the District
Council’s representatives at the Center are compensated; (2) require the
District Council to refer trade show industry jobs in accordance with the
Consent Decree; and (3) authorize the IRO to oversee District Council activities
in the trade show industry.
Judge Haight again ruled in Conboy’s favor.
disciplinary hearing was well-covered in the media.
It generated political momentum to address the influence of organized
crime at the Javits Center, which is owned and operated by a public corporation.
The Governor’s office announced a plan for eliminating the Genovese
Crime Family’s control over carpenters’ jobs at the Center.
The plan called for the Center to hire its own permanent work force;
workers would be screened for criminal records and ties to LCN.
In July 1995, current employees were forced to reapply for their jobs,
and the Center accepted job applications from non-incumbents.
The Center hired five hundred workers, half of whom had not worked there
before, and though new “exhibit workers” became members of the Carpenters
Union, they were covered, as state employees, by a new collective bargaining
As a consequence, the Javits Center has experienced a “complete
turnaround” and has been described as “an emerging ‘hot’ destination for
The 1995 District Council Election
with its resistance to the trusteeship, the District Council claimed that in
promulgating Final Election Rules (FERs), Conboy “exceeded his authority under
the consent decree” and “abused his discretion in making injudicious
The District Council argued that the IRO’s power to supervise the
election did not include the right to run it, but merely to oversee the District
Council’s administration of it. In
determining the intended meaning of “supervise” in the Consent Decree, Judge
Haight looked to an earlier International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) civil
to the parties’ intent in the consent agreement, and to the meaning of
“supervise” in the Landrum-Griffin Act. Judge Haight held that the word should be interpreted broadly,
and found that Conboy had not assigned himself too much power.
Furthermore, he held that none of the District Council’s objections to
the IRO’s conduct of the election was valid.
District Council also objected to: the
lack of exceptions to certain rules in cases of candidates running unopposed;
providing candidates with access to union membership lists, including addresses;
the expense of required mailings; the lack of restrictions on the content of
campaign literature; the complexity of the rules; the method of listing
candidates’ names on the ballots; the confidentiality of nominating petitions;
the prohibition on local unions’ endorsements of candidates; the inclusion of
the position of second vice-president; and in-person voting.
Judge Haight ruled against each of these objections, broadly concluding
that none of Conboy’s FERs was arbitrary or capricious in light of his having
so conscientiously considered the comments regarding the draft FERs he received
from District Council members and leaders.
He also ruled against Local 608’s request to delay the election because
“the Consent Decree was meant to eradicate corruption, not the inherent
advantages attendant to incumbency.” He
stressed the importance of holding the election promptly so the results could be
drafted candidate eligibility requirements in order to keep corrupt candidates
off the ballot. To be eligible to
run for office, a candidate had to have been in good standing for 12 consecutive
months prior to nomination and a member of the UBC for two consecutive years
immediately prior to nomination and never to have been convicted of a crime that
would make him or her ineligible to hold union office.
A member who satisfied the eligibility requirements had to submit to the
IRO a nominating petition with at least 125 signatures of members in good
Once the IRO certified his candidacy, the candidate would have access to
membership meetings to give speeches and to membership lists in order to mail
campaign literature to the rank and file.
Each candidate had the right, at his or her expense, to hire an observer
to witness the distribution of campaign literature and to observe conduct at the
The rules provide candidates equal opportunity to mail campaign
literature and to place campaign material in The Carpenter.
To promote fairness, Conboy limited campaign contributions to $250 per
member and mandated disclosure of campaign finances.
There would be in-person voting by machine ballot except that a member
living 75 miles or more from headquarters could use a mail ballot.
The rules provided for an election committee to examine and approve the
ballot and to be present when ballots were counted.
Each nominated candidate could name one member in good standing to the
election committee. The
committee’s decision would be subject to review by the Election Officer (an
assistant appointed by the IRO) or the IRO.
The rules define election misconduct (including but not limited to voting
fraud, ballot tampering, and forgery) for which the IRO can bring disciplinary
IRO rejected only two of nineteen prospective candidates’ nominating
petitions. Fifteen of the seventeen
candidates who formally accepted nomination were affiliated with one of four
slates. The Unity & Experience
slate put forth candidates for all five executive committee positions
(president, first vice president, second vice president, secretary-treasurer,
and chairman of the trustees), and included District
Council incumbents Fred Devine and Robert Cavanaugh.
The Membership’s Choice slate also put forth candidates for all five
positions. Conboy believed that its
presidential nominee, Local 608 President Patrick Harvey, was the only one of
three candidates with enough support to truly challenge Devine for the
presidency. Harvey “could hardly
be viewed as a reform candidate,” however, because he invoked the Fifth
Amendment during the 1990 RICO case and was connected to Pascal McGuinness.
The other two candidates for president also had blemished records:
John Abbatemarco was an associate of Attilio Bitondo, a convicted briber,
and John Greany had used three Social Security numbers.
Greany, however, ran as an anti-corruption candidate.
His Carpenters for a Stronger Union slate (which also included nominees
for second vice president and chairman of the trustees) promised to return the
union to the membership by eradicating mob ties, reducing officer salaries, and
creating a fair working environment. The American Dream slate promised that its
candidates for first and second vice presidents would replace corruption with
to Conboy, his most important and time-consuming task with respect to the
election was compiling a master list of eligible voters.
In 1994, the District Council provided him with a list of 40,000 names.
After investigating, Conboy pared the list down to 16,719 union members
in good standing.
hired a temporary staff to assist the IRO office with voting procedures.
The election was conducted primarily by voting machines.
No individuals, other than the temporary election
staff and two election observers from each slate, were allowed into the
7,684 union members, about 46 percent of eligible voters, cast ballots.
Each candidate on the Unity and Experience slate, which received 58.7
percent of the total vote, won his election, thereby returning to office
incumbents and others associated with the clique that had long dominated the
candidate was required to disclose information each month regarding campaign
contributions, expenditures, legal services, and campaign bank accounts.
Not surprisingly, the Unity & Experience slate spent significantly
more than its challengers. It reported spending over $55,000 and receiving $52,000 of
donated legal services. It was
principally financed by personal contributions from candidates on its slate.
The Membership’s Choice slate, financed largely by contributions from
slate members and Local 608 members, spent approximately $35,000.
John Abbatemarco, who was not affiliated with any slate, spent $13,000 of
his own money. The American Dream
slate spent $10,000, also of its candidates’ own money.
The IRO’s post-election report did not raise any questions about
campaign donations or expenditures.
Conboy did find some election rule violations.
As chairman of the trustees of the benefit funds, incumbent District
Council president and Unity and Experience candidate Fred Devine’s
responsibility was to ensure that the funds did not support or oppose any
candidate. Conboy found that the
funds’ resources were used to retaliate against a candidate critical of Devine
and to promote Devine’s candidacy in a publication.
After a full hearing, Conboy concluded that Eugene Clarke had been fired
because of his opposition to Devine’s policies.
Conboy ordered him reinstated and ordered Devine to reimburse the benefit
funds $5,760, the cost of the pro-Devine mailings.
Nevertheless, Conboy concluded that the 1995 election had been “honest
and that Devine’s two violations did not affect the election’s outcome.
Therefore, he certified the results.
can we explain the seemingly shocking victory of the same clique that had been
mismanaging the District Council for many years?
Labor racketeers are very deeply entrenched in mobbed-up unions.
They rule by both sticks and carrots.
The pervasive culture of intimidation may convince rank and file members
that the mob-backed faction is too strong ever to be dislodged and that
rebellion will ultimately be punished. Likewise,
the labor racketeers operate a pervasive patronage system that provides many
kinds of benefits to loyalists who then have a vested interest in the regime’s
continuation. In addition, many
labor racketeers are charismatic personalities whom rank and filers find
attractive. Finally, most union
members are apathetic, paying little attention to union activities and
the election, Conboy’s investigations continued.
In 1996, his office charged five local union officers with improperly
(under District Council bylaws) invoking the Fifth Amendment when questioned
during the RICO suit. In 1997, four
of them (including 1995 presidential candidate Patrick Harvey) resigned rather
than go through the disciplinary hearing process.
(The fifth officer ultimately signed a settlement agreement barring him
from union office for life.)
Conboy’s office received information about a member of Local 257 extorting
payments from a contractor, his staff and the District Attorney’s office
persuaded the contractor to cooperate in an investigation.
The union member was arrested in October 1996 when he was caught taking a
He was later convicted of misdemeanor charges and settled the IRO’s
charges by agreeing to be barred from union office.
Conboy also brought charges against a former delegate and trustee of
Local 348 for refusing to give deposition testimony to the IRO’s staff about
his association with a Colombo family capo.
1997, the IRO’s office began investigating the connections between two benefit
funds employees and LCN members.
Also in that year, the IRO vetoed the purchase of expensive cars and life
insurance policies for Local 135’s business agents.
(UBC International subsequently imposed a trusteeship on Local 135.)
In April 1997, the IRO’s office charged the president of Local 531 for
interfering with the IRO’s work and with purchasing a vehicle with union funds
without following appropriate procedures.
The official accepted a settlement barring him from union office for
In 1998, a former Local 257 officer paid a fine to settle charges that he
knowingly accepted shop steward referrals for which he was ineligible.
The former president of Local 257 was investigated for receiving illegal
payments from contractors, violating District Council trade rules, and putting
himself on the out-of-work list although he was employed at the time.
office also found misconduct in the operation of the District Council’s
apprenticeship school. The
school’s funds were used to pay for expensive retirement gifts and apparently
fraudulent consulting fees. The
school’s director also required school employees to carry out renovations on
his home. Conboy reported to Judge
Haight that these and other school expenditures constituted a pattern of
unnecessary and lavish spending.
UBC International’s Trusteeship over, and Restructuring of, the
¶53Because the victors in the 1995 election represented the same faction that
had been allied with organized crime for many years, Conboy encouraged UBC
International President Douglas McCarron to impose a trusteeship on the District
Conboy stated, “In light of such entrenched corruption, it was clear to
us that the only realistic hope of returning the District Council to its
membership required the intervention of the International.”
He stressed the importance of replacing the District Council’s
incumbent officers with “strong and independent outside leadership.”
McCarron complied on June 25, 1996, and appointed Douglas Banes as
supervisor of the District Council.
International’s general executive board conducted a hearing, pursuant to the
UBC constitution, to determine whether President McCarron had acted properly.
Over 100 people testified, including Vice President Banes and IRO Conboy.
Conboy testified about Devine’s taking cash payoffs, his appointment of
Fiorino, his refusal to dismiss Fiorino, his corrupt job referrals, and his
abuse of the chairmanship of the District Council’s benefit funds.
The committee made various findings of wrongdoing.
Among other things, it concluded that:
Devine and the other officers mismanaged the District Council’s cash
reserve so that its net worth dropped from $6.45 million in 1991 to $224,060 in
1996; Devine spent $389,000 on private jets in a period of 30 months;
Devine supplied the staff with luxury cars and paid twice what legitimate
automobile dealers would charge; Devine’s $25,000 car allowance did not
include gas, oil, maintenance or insurance; the union paid Devine’s girlfriend
$60,000 as a “consultant;” Devine’s chauffeur was paid $60,000 a year out
of trust fund money; and Devine used trust fund money to employ Genovese Family
The hearing committee concluded
that the trusteeship had been properly imposed and extended its duration.
¶55Devine and Cavanaugh filed a lawsuit against
McCarron and Banes seeking to dissolve the trusteeship
which, they claimed, violated the UBC constitution and the Landrum-Griffin Act.
Judge Haight ruled that the Plaintiffs had the burden of showing “clear
and convincing evidence that the trusteeship had not been established or
maintained in good faith or for a legitimate reason.”
When they subsequently attempted to produce such evidence, Judge Haight
was not persuaded.
¶56The Banes trusteeship seemed to make some significant reforms aimed at
remedying the financial crisis and combating corruption.
Certain individuals tied to Devine, including his son
and Bernard Cohen, the District Council’s general counsel, were terminated.
Devine was convicted on March 24, 1998 on six felony grand larceny
counts for spending money from the union’s operating and labor-management
trust funds on personal goods and services.
Banes and his team moved to put
the District Council back on sound financial footing by eliminating unnecessary
and inflated salaries, cutting costs, and rationalizing operations.
May 1997, UBC International submitted to the IRO a tripartite plan to
restructure the District Council. First,
the plan called for the District Council to become a “Full Service District
Council.” This would mean that there would be centralized oversight
over the District Council. Its
officers would be accountable to a delegate body which would be elected by the
rank and file. Second, the job
referral system would be run by business agents employed by and subject to
removal by the District Council. Third,
some local unions would be merged.
International President Douglas McCarron said, in support of the plan,
“Despite the [IRO’s] supervision, the Consent Decree and federal
investigations, corruption continues in many local unions throughout the
District Council. Only a
fundamental structural change . . . can eradicate the problem and return the
Union to its members’ control.”
McCarron stated that the “membership has been poorly served by the
present structure,” and noted that the District Council had lost approximately
5,000 union members in 5 years, depleted its $6 million treasury, and incurred
over $5 million in debt.
McCarron argued that greater concentration of authority was the only
solution to the “splintered, whipsawed, and ineffective” power of the
fragmented organization of the NYC District Council.
Lawsuits by local unions and individual carpenters significantly delayed
the restructuring plan’s implementation.
Ultimately, the court held that the plan did not violate the consent
and that prior court approval of the
restructuring plan was not required.
restructuring plan for the District Council included an election proposal more
closely resembling the pre-consent-decree election procedures than Conboy’s
1995 procedures. McCarron rejected
Conboy’s preference for direct rank and file election of Council officers,
pointing out that the 1995 direct election had resulted in Devine’s
Under UBC International’s restructuring plan, the District Council
would employ the business agents and organizers, supervise their work, and
coordinate all collective bargaining, contract enforcement, and organizing
District Council officers would also have the option to merge trust
According to McCarron, this plan constituted a form of representative
democracy that gave members “increasingly meaningful participation because it
makes their collective decisions and actions more viable in the industry and
more productive in collective bargaining.”
Some union members disagreed, labeling the consolidation of the District
Council’s power at the expense of the local unions anti-democratic.
concluded that the selection of the executive committee by delegates rather than
the rank and file might violate the consent decree, but he “broadly
endorsed” the other election procedures.
Indeed, he applauded the reallocation of power to a District Council
delegate body and an executive committee, opining that “a delegate body . . .
would be a sound and positive reform . . . the openness and accountability of
such a system would make it difficult for corrupt individuals to influence the
affairs of the District Council, and would . . . protect . . . its members from
exploitation and abuse at the hands of such members who may ascend to positions
of managerial authority in the future.”
Terminating the IRO and the UBC
October 1996, the court approved another six-month extension of the IRO’s
tenure. Due to the District Council’s shaky financial status, Conboy consented
to a reduction in compensation from $65,000 per month to $45,000 and agreed not
to seek further extensions.
On March 3, 1997, President McCarron, who was not precluded from seeking
extensions, extended the IRO’s tenure through March 4, 1998.
Then, pursuant to the Third Stipulation of Extension, the IRO’s tenure
was extended to June 5, 1998. Finally,
on June 4, 1998, the parties agreed to a final twelve-month extension.
One year later, Judge Haight wrote, “The District Council's refusal to
extend the IRO's tenure means that the IRO will not be able to discharge the
last vestiges of his previously delineated responsibilities.
Accordingly, this is likely the last opportunity that the Court will have
to address former Judge Conboy in a formal opinion.
I seize the opportunity to thank him for his tireless and invaluable
service to the parties and to the Court during the course of an arduous, complex
and challenging case. The Court’s
IRO has been the very model of a modern Court-appointed officer. Ave atque vale.”
1999, UBC International dissolved its trusteeship over the New York District
Council, stating that it had accomplished its goals.
In January 2000, almost ten years after the civil RICO case was filed,
Michael Forde, the president of Local 608, was elected president of the District
Ominously, perhaps, Forde’s father, who preceded Forde as president of
Local 608, had been convicted of Taft-Hartley crimes a decade before.
Even more ominous, Conboy had charged Forde himself in May 1997 with
violating job referral rules in assigning jobs to members of Local 608.
The Necessity and Difficulty of Evaluation
the success of the RICO union trusteeships is essential.
There is no point in bringing such suits, or at least in structuring such
relief, if trusteeships do not solve the problems that provoked the suits in the
first place. Moreover, in order to
make sound decisions about how to attack corrupted unions and other
organizations in the future, we should know what worked best in the past.
do we define success? Do we mean
whether the trusteeship achieved the goals set out in the consent decree?
Some observers might conclude that while a trusteeship failed to meet all
of the government’s goals, embodied in the consent decree, it did
substantially succeed in achieving the most important goal:
eliminating organized crime’s influence over union affairs.
in the starkest terms, a trusteeship has not been successful if the union
remains in the hands of, or under the influence of, organized crime or a clique
that for many years was closely connected to organized crime.
Contrariwise, a trusteeship that purges organized crime figures and their
allies from the union, institutes competitive elections, and achieves regime
change can be called a success. However,
in reality, analysis of union trusteeships does not lend itself to such black or
white conclusions. The possibility
of clandestine ties between union officials and organized crime impedes
definitive scholarly evaluation of trusteeships in labor racketeering cases.
While it is easy to determine that a major organized crime figure has
been expelled from the union, it is very difficult to determine whether all
organized crime associates have been expelled and whether those who have been
expelled still directly or indirectly exert influence over union officers.
FBI or Department of Labor agents may not even know whether such
relationships continue. Relationships
may be too well hidden. And, even
if the agents do know, or at least believe that they know, they will almost
certainly refuse to share such information with university-based researchers.
evaluation is a hazardous undertaking and may be more art than science, it is
essential for a policy initiative as important as the now 20-year-long effort to
reform labor unions plagued by organized crime racketeering.
The accumulation of studies like this one will make it possible to
analyze, debate, and test what works and what does not work in the remediation
of entrenched labor racketeering.
Successes and Failures
judged the trusteeship successful in purging the District Council of
mob-affiliated and corrupt officials, conducting a free and fair election in
1995, cleaning up the Javits Center, and revamping the job referral system.
number of officials connected to organized crime were purged from the union.
Conboy filed disciplinary charges against many union officials reputed to
be linked to organized crime, including Anthony Fiorino, Lenard Simon, and
Enrico Ruotolo. Under the UBC
International trusteeship, all of the 1995 incumbents, including President Fred
Devine, were removed from office.
1995 election gave members the right to vote directly for officials.
Free and fair elections are surely a prerequisite to reform mobbed-up
unions. According to Conboy’s
reports, many union members welcomed direct voting as an important step in the
direction of union democracy.
job referral system has been improving, but it is not fixed.
The changes to the hiring procedures at the Javits Center were thoroughly
successful, but they impacted only some jobs held by union members.
As for the remainder of job referrals, Conboy wrote in March 1996 that
“it can safely be said, given the high volume of carpenters referred from the
out-of-work lists, and diminishing number of complaints we receive concerning
the referral process, that the average rank and file member has greatly
benefited from the implementation of the job referral rules.”
A year later, Conboy reported that complaints had declined to an average
of two or three per month, which his office typically resolved informally.
July 2001, however, Eugene Clarke, a member of Local 608, filed a complaint with
the District Council’s executive committee alleging violation of referral
rules in the Local’s appointment of shop stewards.
He complained that some employees who supported Michael Forde had
received job assignments out of turn and that he had been passed over because of
his public opposition to Forde.
Though the District Council did not admit wrongdoing, it agreed to change
the job referral rules to require more oversight of shop steward appointments.
Pursuant to the same agreement, the District Council appointed former
Assistant U.S. Attorney Walter Mack as Independent Investigator.
His responsibilities include operating a toll-free anti-corruption
hotline and investigating allegations of violations of the job referral rules
in order to “improve the fair and equitable operation of those rules” and to
“reduce the opportunity for their abuse and corruption.”
is hard to say whether the reorganization that shifted power to the District
Council at the expense of the locals should count as a success.
We are inclined to think so because the District Council can be more
easily monitored and held accountable for racketeering in its constituent
However, there are those who predict the opposite.
A leading advocate for union democracy commented at a 1988 congressional
hearing on union democracy:
delegate system is no substitute for direct elections.
A membership of thousands armed with the right to vote, cannot be easily
manipulated by the officers above. But
a delegated body of 150 can reasonably be dominated by an officialdom which
dispenses favors and perks to only 76 lucky delegates.
Direct elections allow the member-voters to control the officers.
Election by delegates allows the officers to control the delegate-voters.
delegate system may be a step in the wrong direction for union democracy.
the 1995 election appeared to be conducted fairly, Fred Devine was re-elected
president, thereby perpetuating the old regime’s control.
Fraud, corrupt practices, and racketeering continued. The IRO and UBC
properly negated the 1995 election by imposing an International trusteeship on
the District Council and terminating Devine.
But in the 1999 election, Michael Forde’s slate won.
Just months later (on September 6, 2000), the Manhattan District Attorney
charged Forde with taking bribes from a mobbed-up contractor in exchange for
allowing the contractor to use nonunion labor on a hotel renovation project.
The 38 codefendants included union officers, contractors, and 11 reputed
Steven L. Crea, the Lucchese Crime Family boss, was the leading organized
crime figure among the defendants.
According to the District Attorney, the Lucchese Family extorted (or
solicited bribes from) contractors by promising protection from other criminal
extortions and by buying off corrupt union officials.
Forde thus became the fourth consecutive District Council president since
1980 to be charged with labor racketeering.
Nevertheless, he was elected in 2002 as executive secretary treasurer
(the new title for the top position in the District Council) with 80 percent of
A number of the defendants have pleaded guilty; Forde’s case is still
pending as of February 2004.
goal of the 1994 RICO suit, that organized crimes’ influence be purged from
the District Council, has clearly not been achieved. The alliance between labor racketeers and corrupt union
officials has proved resilient and adaptable.
As long as rank and file members see or perceive “business as usual”
in the District Council, they will be cynical about prospects for reform and
therefore unwilling to stand up against the old regime.
only have the government, the court, and the court-appointed trustee been unable
to end mob influence in the District Council, it has been unable to prevent LCN
labor racketeers from expanding their influence to Westchester County (just
north of New York City). In
December 2001, the Department of Justice indicted 73 members of the Parrello
Crew of the Genovese Crime Family on 98 counts, including extortion, labor
racketeering, loan-sharking, illegal gambling operations, selling counterfeit
money and gun trafficking. Nine were accused of labor
racketeering involving Locals 11 and 964, which together comprised the Suburban
New York Regional Council of Carpenters. These
defendants allegedly arranged for nonunion workers to complete carpentry jobs,
allowing them to embezzle more than $1 million that should have been paid into
of the Suburban Council’s pension funds.
the IRO could have done anything differently that would have sparked the
emergence of a viable reform movement among the NYC carpenters is an important
question. In the IBT Local 560 trusteeship, which lasted a decade, the
trustee reached out to the rank and file, appointing some individuals to steward
positions and other offices and encouraging others to become involved in union
governance and politics. That
seemed to have helped in bringing a true reform slate to power.
Stimulating reform in the building trades is undoubtedly more difficult
because work is seasonal and insecure; workers move from one job to another and
one contractor to another. The
union-run hiring hall can determine whether an individual carpenter gets a job.
Thus, it is risky for a rank and filer to challenge the incumbent clique.
Of course, it is also harder for reformers to win back a district council
than a local, even a large one like IBT Local 560. The District Council is
made up of some twenty locals spread out across the NYC metropolitan area.
It is difficult for an insurgent candidate to achieve the name
recognition equal to that of incumbent officers.
Conclusion: The Need for
Further Documentation and
government’s and the court’s effort to reform the District Council by
purging mobsters and their allies from the union and its constituent locals and
by stimulating union democracy is a work in progress. The effort has been on-going for more than ten years.
It has consumed millions of dollars and enormous legal resources,
including countless hours of work by Judge Haight,
IRO Conboy and his assistants, Assistant United States Attorneys in the Southern
District of New York, Labor Department investigators, Walter Mack, as well
as, of course, union officials and their attorneys. At best, this is
a very expensive way of correcting a corruption and racketeering problem that
has festered for decades. Failure
in reforming the District Council would cast a pall over the broader effort to
relegate organized crime labor racketeering to twentieth century history.
this point (summer 2003), in light of recent state and federal
prosecutions, we cannot yet call the extraordinary remediation effort
directed at the District Council a success.
Still, there is more hope now than there was a decade ago. The
corrupt elements in the District Council are clearly under pressure. The
membership has had a taste of free elections and much fairer work assignments.
The union’s finances have been made much more transparent and
accountable. The pension and
welfare funds are more secure. But
to get to the next level will require the emergence and triumph of a strong
reformist leadership cadre among the rank and file
carpenters themselves. Any sign that the government and court are losing
interest and readying to withdraw might doom the entire remediation project.
Thus, it is essential for the government and the court to make it
absolutely clear that the old corrupt regime will not be allowed to return to
operate as it had in the past. Beyond
that, encouraging new leadership, and stimulating a reform movement
among the rank and file, are vital.
contribution from the academy would be welcome as well.
It remains a mystery why such a massive and extraordinary legal effort,
in the District Council and in many other union locals, joint councils, and
internationals, has attracted so little scholarly attention.
Reform efforts, like the one described in this article, need to be
documented and analyzed. We need to
identify what works and what does not work.
Furthermore, we need to stimulate new ideas about how to successfully
carry out the goal of organizational reform, especially the reform of
organized-crime dominated labor unions.
But see supra notes 1-2;
Michael H. Belzer & Richard Hurd, Government Oversight, Union
Democracy & Labor Racketeering; Lessons from the Teamster Experience,
20 J. Labor Research
343 (1999); Andrew B. Dean, An Offer the Teamsters Couldn’t
Refuse: The 1989 Consent Decree Establishing Federal Oversight and Ending
Mechanisms, 100 Colum. L. Rev.
2157 (2000); Michael J. Goldberg, Cleaning Labor’s House:
Institutional Reform Litigation in the Labor Movement, 1989 Duke
L.J. 903 (1989); and James
B. Jacobs, Eileen Cunningham & Kimberly Friday, The
RICO Trusteeships After Twenty Years—A Progress Report, 19 The
Labor Lawyer __ (forthcoming Winter/Spring 2004).
See Government’s Motion for
Preliminary Relief, supra note 6,
at 1; Government’s Supp. Compl., supra note 4, at 1 (adding
newly sworn officers to the list of defendants).
Dissident carpenters have formed
the Carpenters for a Democratic Union International (CDUI). They demand
“one member, one vote” for all union
positions, direct membership votes on contracts, and direct election
of delegates. John Kirkland, Some Comments on the Carpenters and
“The State of Today’s Trade Union Movement”, The
Labor Standard, at http://www.laborstandard.org/New_Postings/John_Kirkland_comments.htm.
They publish CDUI News. See
I: Labor Racketeering Prosecutions Related to the NYC District Council of
United States v.
Maritas, Cr. No. 81-122 (E.D.N.Y.)
Former District Council
president Theodore Maritas and Genovese capo Vincent DiNapoli were
indicted for RICO violations.
United States v.
Giangrande, 805 F.2d 391 (2d Cir. 1986)
officer Artie Giandrande, convicted after trial for conspiracy, mail fraud
and illegal labor payoffs.
People v. Bitondo, Ind.
No. 7952/87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.)
Local 257 officers
Attilio Bitondo and Gene Hanley were indicted for receving illegal payoffs
and engaging in extortion.
United States v.
Cervone, et al., Cr. No. 87-579 (E.D.N.Y)
Henry Walaski, an
officer of Local 531 and District Council delegate, was convicted for
violating RICO and receiving illegal payoffs.
People v. Holden, Ind.
No. 9352/87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.)
Local 608 shop steward
William Holden was convicted of criminal contempt and perjury in an
investigation of the Carpenters Union.
People v. Forde, Ind.
No. 7951/87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y.Co.)
Martin Forde, an
officer of Local 608, was convicted for receiving an illegal labor payoff
People v. Zeidman, Ind.
No. 7950/87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.
District Council first
vice president Irving Zeidman was indicted for accepting labor payoffs.
United States v.
Waller, Cr. No. 88-466 (E.D.N.Y.)
Local 531 officer
Robert Waller, Jr. was convicted of extortion.
People v. Hubelbank,
Crim. Complt. No. 9N072405/89 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. N.Y. Co.)
Trustee and former Local 135 officer Israel Hubelbank was convicted of
accepting illegal labor payoffs.
People v. Moscatiello,
Ind. No. 8081/89 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Local 17 businss
manager Benedetto “Benny” Schepis was indicted for crimes involving
II: Opinions and Orders by Judge Haight in Carpenters Litigation
States of America v. District Council of the New York City and Vicinity of the
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, et al., 1991 WestLaw
143507, July 24, 1991 (decision xxx)
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 778 F.Supp. 738, 122 Lab.Cas. P
10,264, Nov. 20, 1991 (decision xxx)
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 782 F.Supp. 920, Feb. 3, 1992
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 1992 WestLaw 111100, May 4, 1992
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 1992 WestLaw 188379, July 30, 1992
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 1993 WestLaw 159959, 125 Lab.Cas. P
10,721, May 12, 1993 (decision xxx)
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 832 F.Supp. 644, 38 Fed. R. Evid. Serv.
627, Sept. 8, 1993 (decision xxx)
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 1993 WestLaw 364443, Sept. 10, 1993
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 1994 WestLaw 75026, March 4, 1994
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 1994 WestLaw 88031, March 11, 1994
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 1994 WestLaw 704811, Dec. 16, 1994
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 880 F.Supp. 1051, 149 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2425, April 6, 1995 (decision xxx)
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 1995 WestLaw 360125, 149 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2779, June 13, 1995 (decision xxx)
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 1995 WestLaw 406108, 153 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2437, July 7, 1995 (decision xxx)
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 1995 WestLaw 595660, Sept. 29, 1995
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 1995 WestLaw 747856, De. 18, 1995
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 1996 WestLaw 48619, Feb. 6, 1996
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 1996 WestLaw 221584, 152 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2353, May 2, 1996 (decision xxx)
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 1996 WestLaw 251868, May 13, 1996
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 1996 WestLaw 334414, June 18, 1996
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 1996 WestLaw 346668, June 19, 1996
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 941 F.Supp. 349, 154 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2281, Sept. 12, 1996 (decision xxx)
v. Conboy, 1997 WestLaw 177890, No. 94 Civ. 9159, April 14, 1997 (decision xxx)
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 1997 WestLaw 269515, May 21, 1997
v. McCarron, 1997 WestLaw 379708, July 9, 1997 (decision xxx)
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 972 F.Supp. 756, July 24, 1997
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 1997 WestLaw 433482, Aug. 1, 1997
Unions 20, 135, 257,296, 531, 740, 902, 1456 of United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners of America v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America, 1997 WestLaw 630179, 157 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2421, Oct. 9, 1997 (decision
Unions 20 et al. v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 1997 WestLaw 802895, Dec.
31, 1997 (decision xxx)
v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 1998 WestLaw 175932, April 14, 1998
Unions 20, 135, 246, 257, 296, 531, 740, 902, 1456, 1536, 1994 and 2287, et al.
v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 1998 WestLaw 690185
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 1998 WestLaw 684462, Oct. 1, 1998
Unions 20 et al. v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 1999 WestLaw 60084, 161
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2369, Feb. 8, 1999 (decision xxx)
Unions 20 et al. v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 1999 WestLaw 60083, 161
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2369, Feb. 8. 1999 (decision xxx)
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 1999 WestLaw 386935, 162 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2354, June 11, 1999 (decision xxx)
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 1999 WestLaw 494121, 162 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2360, July 12, 1999 (decision xxx)
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 1999 WestLaw 731421, 162 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2574, Sept. 20, 1999 (decision xxx)
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 1999 WestLaw 760000, 162 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2574, Sept. 24, 1999 (decision xxx)
v. District Council of Carpenters, 1999 WestLaw 1072471, 163 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2890, Nov. 29, 1999 (decision xxx)
Unions 20 et al. v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 223 F.Supp.2d 491, 48 UCC
Rep.Serv.2d 519, Aug. 15, 2002 (decision xxx)
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 2002 WestLaw 31873460, 171 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 3031, Dec. 24, 2002 (decision xxx)
States v. District Council of Carpenters, 2003 WestLaw 21035292, May 7, 2003