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[1] Associate
Dean and Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law. J.D. – Indiana
University, 1981. Professor at the
University of Dayton School of Law since 1988.
Clerked for a federal district judge and a state court of appeals judge
and was an associate in two criminal defense firms before becoming a professor.
[2] “Virtual
. . . [n]ot physically existing as such
but made by software to appear to do so from the point of view of the program
or the user. . . .” The Oxford English Dictionary 674 (2d ed.
1989). “Virtual . . . [s]imulated;
performing the functions of something that isn't really there.” The
Jargon Dictionary: Terms: The V Terms, available at this location.
[3] Email
from Donn Parker to Susan Brenner (March 17, 2000, on file with the editors).
[4]See, e.g., McConnell International, Cyber Crime . . . and Punishment? Archaic Laws Threaten Global Information
(December 2000), at this location
Damien Reece, The Hacker Cracker,
The Sunday Telegraph 14, Dec. 3,
2000, 2000 WL 29564637. See also Terrence Berg, WWW.Wildwest.gov: The Impact of the Internet on State
Power to Enforce the Law, 2000 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1305 (2000); Marc D.
Goodman, Why the Police Don't Care About
Computer Crime, 10 Harv. J.L.
& Tech. 465, 468‑469 (1997), at this location
[5] This
assumption manifests itself, inter alia, in the adoption of cybercrime-specific
statutes. The West Virginia
legislature, for example, enacted a computer crime code, explaining that
[w]hile various forms of computer crime or abuse might
possibly be the subject of criminal charges . . . based on other provisions of
law, it is appropriate and desirable that a supplemental and additional statute
be provided which specifically proscribes various forms of computer crime and
abuse and provides criminal penalties and civil remedies therefor.
W. Va. Stat. § 61-3C-2. See also W. Va. Stat. § 61-3C-4 to
61-3C-15. Other states have taken
similar measures: Arkansas, for
example, adopted a “computer fraud” statute, e.g.,:
(a) Any person commits computer fraud who intentionally
accesses or causes to be accessed any computer, computer system, computer
network, or any part thereof for the purpose of: (1) Devising or executing any
scheme or artifice to defraud or extort; or (2) Obtaining money, property, or
services with false or fraudulent intent, representations, or promises. (b)
Computer fraud is a Class D felony.
Ark. Stat. § 5-41-103. See also
11 Del. Code § 2738; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 708-891. States have also adopted “computer theft”
statutes, e.g.:
Whoever, intentionally and without claim of right, and
with intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession, takes, transfers,
conceals or retains possession of any computer, computer system, computer
network, computer software, computer program, or data contained in a computer,
computer system, computer program, or computer network with a value in excess
of five hundred dollars ($500) is guilty of a felony and shall be subject to
the penalties set forth in §§ 11-52-5.
If the value is five hundred dollars ($500) or less, then the person is guilty
of a misdemeanor and may be punishable by imprisonment for not more than one
year, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-52-4. See also Minn. Stat. § 609.89; N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:20-25.
For a
collection and classification of cybercrime laws adopted by the various states,
see Shell Draft: Model State
Computer Crimes Code, available at this location. See also
Susan W. Brenner, State Cybercrime
Legislation in the United States of America: A Survey, 7 Rich. J. L. & Tech. 28 (2001), at this location. See
generally Draft Convention on Cyber-crime, Eur. Consult Ass. 12th
Session, Draft No. 25 Rev., Preamble and Ch. II § 1 (Dec. 22, 2000) available at this location.
[6] It is,
of course, at least conceivable that “cybercrimes” might represent an entirely
new approach to imposing criminal liability, one which uses different elements
in so doing and/or which defines the traditional elements in non-traditional
fashion. This issue is explored in a later
section. See infra § III.
[8] See, e.g.,Wayne
R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 1.2(d)
(1986).
[15] See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr.,
Substantive Criminal Law § 1.2(b) (1986).
[16] See infra
§ III. See
also Margaret Wertheim, The
Pearly Gates of Cyberspace: A History of Space from Dante to the Internet
230-36 (1999). Some would disagree with
this characterization. As computer
security expert Donn Parker correctly points out,
[c]yberspace is not virtual and different from real
physical space. Cyberspace consists of physical electronic circuits in boxes,
magnetic surfaces, wires, transistors set in one of two states (actually
flowing electrons or no electrons), bursts of electrons and photons, switches
set in specific states, lights on or off, etc. . . .
Email from Donn
Parker to Susan Brenner (March 16, 2000, on file with the editors).
Taking
Mr. Parker’s point, it is perhaps more correct to say that cyberspace is (or is
experienced as) a virtual world which emerges from the structured interactions
of electrical impulses. Like its
historical antecedents, virtual worlds such as those Dante describes in The Divine Comedy, cyberspace is an
intellectual construct; but unlike those virtual worlds, it is not merely an
intellectual construct. It is a “new”
space, a space that has its origins in physical reality but which transcends
that reality:
[T]his new digital space is `beyond’ the space that
physics describes, for the cyber-realm is not made up of physical particles and
forces, but of bits and bytes. These packets of data are the
ontological foundation of cyberspace, the seeds from which the global phenomena
`emerges.’ It may be an obvious statement to say that cyberspace is not made up
of physical particles and forces, but it is also a revolutionary one. Because
cyberspace is not ontologically rooted in these physical phenomena, it is not subject to the laws of physics, and
hence it is not bound by the limitations of those laws. . . .
. . . . The electronic gates of the silicon chip have
become, in a sense, a metaphysical gateway, for our modems transport us out of
the reach of physicists' equations into an entirely `other’ realm. When I `go’
into cyberspace I leave behind both Newton's and Einstein's laws. Here, neither
mechanistic, or relativistic, or quantum laws apply. Traveling from Web site to
Web site, my `motion’ cannot be described by any dynamical equations. The arena
in which I find myself online cannot be quantified by any physical metric; my journeys there
cannot be measured by any
physical ruler. The very concept of "space" takes on here a new . .
. meaning. . . .
Ironically,
cyberspace is a technological by-product of physics. The silicon chips, the
optic fibers, the liquid crystal display screens, the telecommunications
satellites, even the electricity that powers the Internet are all by-products
of this most mathematical science. Yet if cyberspace could not exist without
physics, neither is it bound within the purely physicalist conception of the
real. In the parlance of complexity theory, cyberspace is an emergent phenomena, something that is more
than the sum of its parts. This new `global’ phenomena emerges from the interaction of its myriad
interconnected components, and is not reducible to the purely physical laws
that govern the chips and fibers from which it indubitably springs.
Richard A.
Bartle, The Pearly Gates of Cyberspace
(June 16, 1999), at this location.
[18] See, e.g., William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: Of Public Wrongs
168; What is Fraud?, available at this location; Bouvier’s
Law Dictionary (1856) (defining fraud), available at this location. States have, of course, adopted statutes
specifically outlawing the use of the telephone or radio to perpetrate
fraud. See,
e.g.,Ohio Rev. Code §
2913.05(A). The Ohio statute states:
No person, having devised a scheme to defraud, shall
knowingly disseminate, transmit, or cause to be disseminated or transmitted by
means of a wire, radio, satellite, telecommunication, telecommunications
device, or telecommunications service any writing, data, sign, signal, picture,
sound, or image with purpose to execute or otherwise further the scheme to
defraud.
Id.
[19] See, e.g.,Cal.
Penal § 187 (“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a
fetus, with malice aforethought”); S. A. Reilly, Our Legal Heritage: The First Thousand Years 600-1600, available at this location
(quoting homicide prohibitions in effect in Britain prior to the year 600).
[20] See, e.g.,N.Y.
Penal Law § 125.05 (Consol.) (1997), available
at this location.
Homicide means conduct which
causes the death of a person or an unborn child with which a female has been
pregnant for more than twenty-four weeks under circumstances constituting
murder, manslaughter in the first degree, manslaughter in the second degree,
criminally negligent homicide, abortion in the first degree or self-abortion in
the first degree.
See
alsoTex. Penal Code
§ 19.01(a) (1994) (“A person commits criminal homicide if he intentionally,
knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence causes the death of an
individual”).
[21] There
are, of course, exceptions to this principle, one being the crime of vehicular
homicide. See, e.g.,Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 18-306(1)(1) (1999) (“If a person operates or drives a motor
vehicle in a reckless manner, and such conduct is the proximate cause of the
death of another, such person commits vehicular homicide”). See also
11 Del. Code § 630A(a)(2000); Kan Stat. Ann. § 21-3405 (1999); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-213(a)
(2000). Vehicular homicide was
recognized as a separate offense, early in this century, because of the carnage
associated with the proliferation of motor vehicles. See, e.g., Dist. of
Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930); Story v. United States,16 F.2d 342,
344-345 (D.C. Cir. 1926). It is an
example of the approach criticized above, e.g., of drafting method-specific
offenses, since the automobile is merely the instrumentality by which death is
caused, and any instance of taking someone’s life could easily be prosecuted
under regular homicide statutes. If,
for example, someone used an automobile to intentionally kill another person,
this could be prosecuted as first-degree murder. See, e.g., Love v.
Com., 2001 WL 174040 (Ky. 2001) (“wanton murder”); Com. v. Chase, 433 Mass.
293, 295, 741 N.E.2d 59, 63 (Mass. 2001) (murder). If someone did this recklessly, it could be prosecuted as
manslaughter or second-degree murder, and if they did this negligently, it
could be prosecuted as negligent homicide.
See, e.g., Navratil v.
State, 2001 WL 92688 (Tex. App. 2001) (manslaughter); State v. Merkle, 2001 WL
81253 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (manslaughter); State v. Steen, 615 N.W.2d 555, 2000
ND 152 (N.D. 2000) (negligent homicide).
See alsoAriz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1101(2) (2000)
(“‘Homicide’ means first degree murder, second degree murder, manslaughter or
negligent homicide”).
[23] Treason
Act 1351 (c.2).
[24] . . . . Crime is an act that injures
another. . . .
Let's take an example, say I
. . . . punch you in the nose, there is little doubt in anyone's mind that a
crime has been committed. . . .
Congress, and the various
state legislatures. . . . have legislated `crime prevention’ measures, with the
express purpose of preventing crime. . . .
For example, the act of
threatening —I'm going to punch you in the nose.’— now constitutes a crime,
which is good because the crime of punching someone in the nose is prevented.
The person threatening can be incarcerated, thereby preventing the crime, long
before the crime was committed, or, perhaps, even contemplated. . . .
Now, we can take this `crime prevention’
one step further. Since it is permissible to prevent crime by incarcerating
someone who has expressed that he has contemplated a crime, perhaps we can
prevent even more crime . . . by going the next step. . . . and [outlawing] the
crime of contemplation, `I think I'll punch you in the nose.’. . .
Laws - Part VI:
Crime, available at this location.
[25] See, e.g.,. LaFave
& Scott, Jr., supra note 8,
§ 1.2 (1986) (“there can be no criminal liability for bad thoughts alone; there
is a requirement of some sort of action (or non-action when there is a duty to
act) for criminal liability”); Wayne R.
LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 3.2 (1986)
(same). See also Emanuel Capsule
Summary: Criminal Law (Actus Reus and Mens Rea), at this location (“Mere thoughts are never punishable as
crimes”). One argument against
recognizing “thought crimes” is the impossibility of enforcing such laws given
the inherent unknowability of another person’s mind. SeeLeo Katz, Bad Acts and Guilty Minds:
Conundrums of the Criminal Law 153 (1987). Another obstacle for American legislators is the First Amendment,
which “protects against the prosecution of thought crime.” United
States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 714 (1998), available at
this location
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
“Hate
crimes” are sometimes characterized as “thought crimes.” See,
e.g., Robert J. Corry, Jr., Burn
This Article: It Is Evidence in Your Thought Crime Prosecution, 4 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 461, 470
(2000). This is a misnomer: “Hate
crimes” do require some affirmative act or culpable omission to act; they are
not predicated simply on harboring “bad thoughts” or “hatred” toward
another. See, e.g., Terry A. Maroney, Note, The Struggle Against Hate Crime: Movement at a
Crossroads, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
564, 564 (1998) (“Hate crime may be defined as acts of violence motivated by
animus against persons and groups because of race, ethnicity, religion,
national origin or immigration status, gender, sexual orientation, disability .
. . and age”). The existence of such
thoughts usually serves to enhance the penalty that can be imposed upon conviction
for a traditional “crime.” See, e.g., Martinez v. State, 980 S.W. 2d
662, 663-664 (Tex. App. 1998); Tex.
Penal Code § 12.47.
[26] The
Model Penal Code, which is the model act on which most states have based their
criminal codes, uses four culpable mental states: purposely, knowingly, recklessly
and negligently. See Model
Penal Code § 2.02. See generally Commonwealth v. Henley, 504
Pa. 408, 474 A.2d 1115 (Pa. 1984), available
at this location
(“The Model Penal Code, drafted in 1962, represents the work of a decade of
scholarly drafting, codification, and clarifications in all areas of criminal
law by the American Law Institute, and has been used as a model for crimes
codes throughout the United States”). In this scheme, acts done purposely are
considered the most serious, with acts done knowingly being the next most
severe, and so on down the hierarchy to negligent acts, which are considered
the least severe of these four alternatives.
See, e.g.,Model Penal Code §§ 210.2-210.4
(homicide offenses graded in severity according to whether the offender acted
purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently). The Model Penal Code’s hierarchical approach was an attempt to
overcome the ambiguities inherent in using the generally ill-defined (e.g.,
“maliciously,” “intentionally,” “willfully”) terms the common law had developed
to operationalize the concept of mens rea. SeeLaFave & Scott, supra note 8, § 3.4 (1986).
[27] SeeLaFave
& Scott, supra note 8,
§ 1.2 (1986). See also id.
§§ 3.2, 3.3 & 3.4 (1986). For a slightly
different formulation, see Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law
329 (1987).
[28] See, e.g.,Ala.
Code § 13A-13-1 (2001); 11 Del.
Code § 1001(2000). See alsoTenn.
Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal): Bigamy, available at this location
(last visited Mar. 16, 2001).
[29] See, e.g.,LaFave
& Scott, supra note 8,
§ 1.2(c) (1986); Rollin M. Perkins &
Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 456-458 (3d ed. 1982). See also
Owens v. State , 352 Md. 663,
684, 724 A.2d 43, 53 (Md. 1999); State v.
Ishaque,312 N.J. Super. 207, 212, 711 A.2d 416, 419 (N.J. Super.
1997).
[30] But see LiveWED: Tie the Knot (“Walk down
the virtual wedding aisle and get hitched in cyberspace”), at this location. Of course, as this site notes, a virtual
wedding is not legally binding, and a legally binding marriage is a
prerequisite for a bigamy prosecution. See, e.g.,Cal. Penal § 281.
[31] Actually,
one could commit “virtual bigamy” in the context of one of the virtual worlds
known as MOO’s or MUD’s. Visitors who
log into one of these worlds assume one or more identities, or characters, and
use those identities to interact with other visitors. See, e.g.,Julian Dibbell, My Tiny Life (1998); Julian
Dibbell, A Rape in Cyberspace, at
this location;
Basic Information about MUDs and MUDding,at this location. Characters participating in a MOO or a MUD can, and do, arry each other. See, e.g., The World of Exodus: “Marriage”, at this location
(“Any mortal character may marry any other mortal character”). If a MOO or MUD were to require that
marriage be monogamous, then a character in that world could presumably commit
“virtual bigamy” by contracting contemporaneous marriages to two or more other
characters. See, e.g., Sorenda Theme,
at this location (outlining MUD in which marriage would be monogamous and bigamy
would be grounds for divorce). See generally The Policies of “Age of Chivalry”, at this location
(rules for marriage on MUD, which imply monogamy). Cf. The World of Exodus: “Marriage”, at this location
( “[f]or simplicity’s sake . . . you may only marry one person at any given
ceremony”).
However,
even if this scenario were to be realized, this is not a matter with which the
law currently concerns itself or is likely to do so given the policies that are
responsible for criminalizing bigamy. The virtual bigamist’s conduct would
not, for example, result in the production of children, one set of whom would
be illegitimate, and it is unlikely to threaten the stability of marriages and
families that are carried out in the “real world.” See generally
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), available
at this location; Murphy v.
Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885), available
at this location. Of course, the MOO or MUD could outlaw
virtual bigamy and impose sanctions, such as public humiliation, banishment or
suspension from participating in the virtual world or even execution, e.g., the
deletion of the offender’s character. See, e.g., Sorenda Theme,at this location
(penalties for premarital sex).
[32] See, e.g., 1999 Model State Computer Crimes
Code § 2.03.1 (stalking) (1999), at this location; 1999 Model State
Computer Crimes Code § 5.01 (fraud and embezzlement), at this location; 1999 Model
State Computer Crimes Code § 601.1 (forgery), at this location.
[33] Model Penal Code § 221.1(1). See,
e.g.,Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 18-4-202. See alsoTenn.
Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal): Burglary, available at this location.
[34] See Wayne
R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 8.13(a)
(1986).
[35] See, e.g., Tenn.
Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal): Burglary, available at this location.
[36] Model Penal Code § 221.2(1).
[37] See, e.g.,Haw.
Rev. Stat. § 708-813 (2000).
[38] See, e.g.,Tenn.
Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal): Criminal Trespass, available at this location.
[39] Model Penal Code § 224.1(1). See,
e.g.,Ala. Code §§
13A-9-2 & 13A-9-3.
[40] Model Penal Code § 224.1(1).
[41] See, e.g.,Tenn.
Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal): Forgery, available at this location.
[42] SeeWayne
R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 8.7
(1986). See, e.g.,D.C. Code
§ 22-3821(a).
[43] See32
Am. Jur. 2dFalse Pretenses
§ 4 (1995).
[44] See, e.g., Criminal Model Jury Instructions
2000 Edition, 6.18.1001C & 6.18.1014, available
at this location.
[45] See, e.g.,Alaska
Stat. §§ 11.61.125 & 11.61.127; Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 53a - 196c & 53a-196d. See also 18 U.S. §§
2251, 2252 & 2252A. But see United States v. Corp, 236 F.3d
325 (2001) (commerce clause not applicable to pornography distribution, per
Lopez).
[46] See, e.g.,Ark.
Code Ann. §§ 5-68-203, 5-68-205, 5-68-303, 5-68-304. See alsoArk. Code Ann. §§ 5-68-302
(defining obscene and obscenity).
[47] See, e.g.,Tenn.
Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal): Obscenity, available at this location.
[48] See, e.g.,Alaska
Stat. §§ 11.61.125 & 11.61.127.
[49] See, e.g.,Tenn.
Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal): Using Minors in obscene material, available at this location.
[50] See, e.g.,Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 531.020 (2000); mo.
Ann. Stat. § 573.020 (2000).
[51] See, e.g., Wayne Petherick, Cyber-Stalking: Obsessional Pursuit and the Digital
Criminal,The Crime Library,
at this location.
See
generally M.
Katherine Boychuk, Are Stalking Laws
Unconstitutionally Vague or Overbroad?, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 769 (1994); Kathleen G. McAnaney Laura A.
Curliss & C. Elizabeth Abeyta‑Price, From
Imprudence to Crime: Anti-Stalking Law, 68 Notre Dame L.R.
819 (1993).
[52] N.C. Gen. Stat. §
14-277.3. See alsoOr. Rev.Stat.
§ 163.732; Utah Code §
76-5-106.5.
[53] See, e.g.,Iowa
Code Ann. § 708.11.
[54] See, e.g., People v. Borrelli, 77
Cal.App.4th 703, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 00 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 480 (Cal. Ct. App.
2000); State v. Prince, 335 S.C. 466, 517 S.E.2d 229 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999).
[55] See, e.g.,Tenn.
Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal): Stalking, available at this location.
[56] Model Penal Code § 223.2(1). See alsoModel Penal Code § 223.2(2)
(theft of immovable property consists of unlawfully transferring property or an
interest in the property to oneself).
[57] See, e.g.,Tenn.
Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal): Theft, available at this location.
[58] 26 Am. Jur.2d. Embezzlement § 1
(1996).
[59] See, e.g., Manual of Model Criminal Jury
Instructions for the District Courts of the Eighth Circuit, 6.18.656, available at this location.
[60] See,
e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. §
39-14-408(a). See alsoCal.
Penal § 594.
[61] See, e.g.,Tenn.
Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal): Vandalism, available at this location.
[62] See, e.g., Ira P. Robbins, Double Inchoate Crimes, 26 Harv. J. on Legis. 1, 3 (1989). See also ‘Lectric
Law Library, Criminal Law Outline, at
this location.
[63] In
criminal law, offenses are of two types: A completed “crime” is known as a
substantive offense, while an incomplete crime is known as an inchoate, or
incomplete, offense. See Black’s
Law Dictionary, “substantive offense” (an offense “which is complete
of itself and not dependent on another”).
See, e.g., United States
v. Gottlieb, No. 96-3278 (10th Cir. 1998), available at this location.
See generally law.com Dictionary, “substantive” &
“inchoate”, at this location.
[64] See, e.g., Ira P. Robbins, Double Inchoate Crimes, 26 Harv. J. on Legis. 2-4 (1989). See also
Incomplete (Inchoate) Crimes, at this location.
[65] Assume,
for example, that Jane Doe has for some reason decided she wants to kill her
next door neighbor, Fred Smith. In preparation
for carrying out her murderous intent, Doe purchases a rifle, intending to use
it to kill Smith. Her plans go awry,
however, either because Smith learns of her intent, reports her to the police
and she is apprehended, or because the rifle fails to fire when she aims it at
Smith and pulls the trigger.
[66] See, e.g., Tennessee Pattern Jury
Instructions (Criminal): Criminal Attempt, at this location. For a jury to convict someone of attempt,
the jurors must find, beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that the defendant
intended to commit the specific offense of_____________________; and (2) either
(a) that the defendant did some act or caused something to happen that would
have constituted [this offense] if the defendant's beliefs at the time he/she
acted had in fact been true or (b) that the defendant did some act
intending to cause an essential element of [that offense] to occur, and at the
time believed the act would cause the element to occur without further action
on the defendant's part; or (c) that the defendant did some act
intending to complete a course of action or cause a result that would
constitute [this offense] under the circumstances, as the defendant believed
them to be at the time, and his/her actions constituted a substantial step
toward the commission of [that offense].
Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal): Criminal Attempt, at this location. See also Manual of Model Criminal Jury
Instructions for the District Courts of the Eighth Circuit, 6.21.846B, at
this location.
[67] See, e.g.,Tenn.
Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal): Criminal Conspiracy, available at this location. Generally, to convict someone of conspiracy
a jury must find that the prosecution proved the following elements beyond a
reasonable doubt: (1) that the
defendant entered into an agreement with one or more people to commit the
offense of __________________ ; It is not necessary that the “object of the
agreement be attained.” and (2) that each of the parties to the conspiracy
intended that [this offense] be committed; and (3) that one of the parties to
the conspiracy committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. An
overt act is an act done by one of the parties to carry out the intent of the
conspiracy and it must be a step toward the execution of the conspiracy. Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions
(Criminal): Criminal Conspiracy, available at this location. Some conspiracy statutes do not require the
government to prove the commission of an overt act. See, e.g., Manual
of Model Criminal Jury Instructions for the District Courts of the Eighth
Circuit, 6.21.846A, available at this location.
[68] See, e.g., Tennessee Pattern Jury
Instructions (Criminal): Solicitation, available at this location. To convict someone of solicitation, a jury
must find that the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant by means of oral, written, or electronic communication directly or
through another, intentionally commanded, requested, or hired another to commit
the offense of _________________________________, with the intent that [this
offense] be committed. Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal):
Solicitation, available at this location.
[69] See Cambridge International Dictionary of English, available at this location. See also
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, this location
(defining vigilante as “one who takes or advocates the taking of law
enforcement into one’s own hands”). See, e.g., J.W. Smurr, Some Afterthoughts on the Vigilantes, this location.
The
definitions given above capture the sense in which the term is used
generically. See, e.g., Kelly D. Hine, Vigilantism
Revisited: An Economic Analysis of the Law of Extra-Judicial Self-Help or Why
Can’t Dick Shoot Henry for Stealing Jane’s Truck, 47 Am. U. L. Rev.
1221, 1224 (1998). A scholar of the
phenomenon has crafted a more precise, “legal” definition, e.g.,
[a]ccording to Professor Burrows, classic vigilantes (1)
are members of an organized committee; (2) are established members of the
community; (3) proceed for a finite time and with definite goals; (4) claim to
act as a last resort because of a failure of the established law enforcement
system; and (5) claim to work for the preservation and betterment of the existing
system. Under Professor Burrows'
definition the anti-abortionists and militiamen do not qualify as true
vigilantes—the anti-abortionists failing because of their desire to alter the
existing system, the militias failing because of their perpetual nature.
Kelly D. Hine, Vigilantism Revisited, supra, 47 Am. U. L.
Rev. at 1224-1225 (notes omitted) (citing William E. Burroughs, Vigilante!
13-14 (1976). This article will use the
generic definition because it is concerned with more informal, “popular” types
of vigilantism. See infra,
§III.
[70] See, e.g.,Alaska
Stat. § 12.62.005 (legislative intent that criminal code be administered
“in a manner that protects victims of crime, allows the proper administration
of justice and avoids vigilantism”). See also Kelly D. Hine, Vigilantism Revisited: An Economic Analysis of the
Law of Extra-Judicial Self-Help or Why Can’t Dick Shoot Henry for Stealing
Jane’s Truck, 47 Am. U. L.
Rev. 1221, 1227-1228 (1998):
the established legal system treats vigilantes no differently
than other citizens. If the legislature criminalizes the underlying conduct and
the accused is unable to raise a . . . statutorily recognized defense, then the
vigilante conduct is not tolerated in the eyes of the law.
As this article
explains, rather than being criminalized, vigilantism has been proposed as a
defense to criminal charges based on the vigilante’s unlawful conduct. See, Kelly D. Hine, Vigilantism Revisited, 47 Am. U. L. Rev.
at 1227-1228.
[71] See, e.g., 18 U.S. § 2331(1)(A) (2000) (“the
term `international terrorism’“ defined as including “violent acts or acts
dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United
States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed
within the jurisdiction of the United States or any State”). See alsoAriz. Rev. Stat. §
13-2308.1(B). A number of states have
the distinct offense of making “terroristic threats,” which generally seems to
consist of threatening to commit a crime in order to induce “public inconvenience.” See,
e.g., 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. ann.
§ 2706 (2000) (terroristic threats consists of threatening to commit a crime of
violence in order to induce terror in another or to cause “serious public
inconvenience”). AccordAla.
Code § 13A-10-15(a) (2000); Minn.
Stat. Ann. § 609.713
(2000); Wy. Stat. § 6-2-505(a)
(2000).
[72] 18 U.S.
§ 3077 (2000). See also Yonah Alexander, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century: Threats and
Responses, 12 DePaul Bus.
L.J. 59, 63 (1999/2000) (“the use or threat, for purposes of advancing a
political, religious, or ideological course of action which involves serious
violence against any person or property, endangers the life of any person, or
creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of
the public”).
[73] See, e.g., United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F.
Supp. 2d 189, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (terrorists responsible for bombing U.S.
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania charged with, inter alia, 223 counts of murder
and conspiracy to commit murder).
[77] See § II, supra. See, e.g., Manual of Model Criminal Jury
Instructions for the District Courts of the Eighth Circuit §§ 3.09 & 3.11
(2000), available at this location at 71, 78. See also Tennessee Pattern Jury
Instructions (Criminal) 2.03, available at this location, & 2.04, available at this location.
[79] For the
difference between substantive and inchoate offenses, see supra
§ II.
[81] See, e.g.,
R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-52-4
(2001).
Whoever, intentionally and without claim of right, and
with intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession, takes, transfers,
conceals or retains possession of any computer, computer system, computer
network, computer software, computer program, or data contained in a computer,
computer system, computer program, or computer network with a value in excess
of five hundred dollars ($500) is guilty of a felony and shall be subject to
the penalties set forth in § 11-52-5.
If the value is five hundred dollars ($500) or less, then the person is guilty
of a misdemeanor and may be punishable by imprisonment for not more than one
year, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.
See also
11 Del. Code § 933 (2000); Minn. Stat. § 609.89 (2000); N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:20-25 (2001); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-152.6 (2000). See
generally 1999 Revision of Model State Computer Crimes Code § 5.02
(1999), at this location.
[83] See, e.g.,Wayne
R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 8.4
(1986).
[84] See, e.g.,David L. Carter, Computer Crime Categories: How Techno-Criminals
Operate, ‘Lectric Law Library,
at this location.
[85] See, e.g., Lalit Kumar, Thieves Break Into Bank, Take Away CPU’s, The Times of India (Feb. 2, 2001), available at 2001 WL 10609880; Kaitlin
Gurney, Philadelphia-Area Microchip Thefts
Linked to Bigger Ring, Knight-Ridder
Tribune Business News(Dec. 11, 2000), available
at 2000 WL 30569642.
[86] See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Henley, 504 Pa.
408, 412, 474 A.2d 1115, 1117 (Pa. 1984), available
at this location
(“The Model Penal Code, drafted in 1962, represents the work of a decade of
scholarly drafting, codification, and clarifications in all areas of criminal
law by the American Law Institute, and has been used as a model for crimes
codes throughout the United States”).
[87] See Model
Penal Code § 223.7.
[88] (1) A person is guilty of theft is he
purposely obtains services which he knows are available only for compensation,
by deception or threat, or by false token or other means to avoid payment for
the service. "Services" includes labor, professional service,
transportation, telephone or other public service, accommodation in hotels,
restaurants or elsewhere, admission to exhibitions, use of vehicles or other
movable property. Where compensation for service is ordinarily paid immediately
upon the rendering of such service, as in the case of hotels and restaurants,
refusal to pay or absconding without payment or offer to pay gives rise to a
presumption that the service was obtained by deception as to intention to pay.
(2) A person commits theft if,
having control over the disposition of services of others, to which he is not
entitled, he knowingly diverts such services to his own benefit or to the
benefit of another not entitled thereto.
Model Penal Code § 223.7.
[90] See 1999 Revision of Model State
Computer Crimes Code § 5.02.4(C), available
at this location
[91] See 1999 Revision of Model State
Computer Crimes Code § 5.02.4(B), available
atthis location.
[92] See, e.g., Principia Cybernetica Web: Zero
Sum Games, at this location:
A game is an interaction or
exchange between two (or more) actors, where each actor attempts to optimize a
certain variable by choosing his actions (or `moves’) towards the other actor
in such a way that he could expect a maximum gain, depending on the other's
response. One traditionally distinguishes two types of games. Zero-sum games
are games where the amount of `winnable goods’ (or resources in our
terminology) is fixed. Whatever is gained by one actor, is therefore lost by
the other actor: the sum of gained (positive) and lost (negative) is zero. . .
.
Chess, for example, is a zero-sum
game: it is impossible for both players to win (or to lose). . . .
[93] See, e.g., Richard Power, Tough Questions on ISP Security, Computer Security Alert (Oct. 1997), available at this location.
[94] See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gerulis, 420 Pa.Super.
266, 285-87, 616 A.2d 686, 695-96 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). See also Model
Penal Code § 223.7(1) (one commits theft if “he purposely obtains services
which he knows are available only for compensation, by deception or threat, or
by false token or other means to avoid payment for the service”).
[95] See, e.g., Collins v. State, 946 P.2d 1055,
1059, 113 Nev. 1177, 1183 (Nev. 1997) (information as property); Schalk v.
State , 823 S.W.2d 633, 644 (Texas Crim. App. 1991).
[96] See, e.g., State v. Tran, 93 Wash. App.
1079, 1999 WL 44224 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
[97] See, e.g., State v. Smith, 115 Wash.2d 434,
798 P.2d 1146, (Wash. 1990).
[98] See, e.g., Dreiman v. State, 825 P.2d 758,
761 (Wyo. 1992) (“although the owner may retain possession of the original
property, there has been nevertheless a deprivation of property when a copy is
made and retained by another”). In Dreiman, the court held that the
defendant’s act of copying down his victim’s unlisted phone number, social
security number and insurance policy number was a deprivation of property
encompassed by the state’s larceny statute and therefor sufficient to establish
the predicate for a burglary conviction.
See United States v.
DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972, 977-978 (3d Cir. 1976), Williams v.
Superior Court, 81
Cal. App. 3d 330, 341-42, 146 Cal. Rptr. 311, 317 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); People v. Parker, 217 Cal. App. 2d 422, 426, 31 Cal. Rptr. 716, 719 (Cal. Ct. App.
1963).
[99] Software
theft or piracy is addressed by federal law, since it is considered to
constitute a violation of copyright laws, which are the exclusive province of
the federal government. See, e.g., 1999 Revision of Model State
Computer Crimes Code § 5.02.2, available at this location.
[101] See, e.g., Ga. Code § 16-8-41(a) (2000) (“A person commits the offense of armed robbery
when, with intent to commit theft, he or she takes property of another from the
person or the immediate presence of another by use of an offensive weapon, or
any replica, article, or device having the appearance of such weapon”).
[102] See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 11.46.180(a) (2001) (“A person commits theft by deception if,
with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate property of
another . . . the person obtains the property of another by deception”).
[103] W. LaFave & A. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 8.11
(2d ed. 1986).
[104] See id.
§§ 8.1-.2, 8.8(a).
[108] See National Consumer’s League, supra note 108, available at this location
; National Fraud Information Center, The Top Ten Internet Fraud Reports Chart,
at this location (last updated Mar.26, 2001).
[112] See 1999 Revision of the Model State
Computer Crimes Code, § 5.01, available at this location.
[114] See 1999 Revision of the Model State
Computer Crimes Code, § 5.01, supra
note 113, available at this location.
[116] See Old
West Law Lassos Auction Site Scam, Chicago Tribune - Business at 5
(Nov. 14, 1999); Sandra Gonzales, DA’s
Office Puts Frontier-Age Law to Modern Use, San Jose Mercury News
(November 10, 1999), available at
this location.
Using an obscure 1872 law
originally intended to prosecute shady horse traders, the Santa Clara County
District Attorney's Office has charged a 38-year-old Mountain View, Calif., man
with running a `mock auction’ after he allegedly collected money from bidders
on the eBay auction site in exchange for electronics goods he only rarely
delivered.
The alleged victims stretched from the
United States to Europe and Asia.
`This law goes back to the Old
West, to the days of covered wagons and gunslingers,’ said Deputy District
Attorney Frank Berry.
But Berry said the frontier-days
statute fits nicely with his case against auctioneer Jonathan You, even if the
law had been forgotten until a new kind of auctions became popular with the
growth of the Internet.
Prosecutors brought the charges
against You after police received numerous complaints in the past year from Web
surfers who claimed he didn't deliver what he had promised.
According to Berry, You used three
different business names to auction items priced under $200, usually computer
components such as hard drives or memory chips. Once he got the money from the
winning bidder, he would deliver the goods late, send an inferior item or not
produce anything at all.
Berry estimates You misled about
300 people around the world. "We believe he would auction first, then try
to find the goods later," he said.
Old West Law
Lassos Auction Site Scam, Chicago Tribune - Business at 5
(Nov. 14, 1999). The statute in
question is California Penal Code § 535, which provides as follows:
Every person who obtains any money
or property from another, or obtains the signature of another to any written
instrument, the false making of which would be forgery, by means of any false
or fraudulent sale of property or pretended property, by auction, or by any of
the practices known as mock auctions, is punishable by imprisonment in the
state prison, or in the county jail not exceeding one year, or by fine not
exceeding two thousand dollars ($ 2,000), or by both such fine and
imprisonment, and, in addition, is disqualified for a period of three years
from acting as an auctioneer in this state.
[118] This
does not extend to computer passwords.
As is explained elsewhere, there is no crime of “password forgery”; this
phrase is erroneously used to refer to the offense of password theft. See
1999 Revision of the Model State Computer Crimes Code § 6.01.2, available at this location.
[119] See, e.g., People
v. Avila, 770 P.2d 1330 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (forgery can be
committed by any number of artificial means, including a computer). See also
1999 Revision of the Model State Computer Crimes Code § 6.01.1, available at this location. See
generally Jones v. State,
907 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
[120] See, e.g., Benson
v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 467 (1888) (Court rejected the argument
that forgery could only be committed with a pen, holding that the nature of the offense was not changed if
it was committed by “printing, or by stamping, or with an engraved plate, or by
writing with a pen”). Cf. 1999 Revision of the Model State
Computer Crimes Code § 6.01.1, available at this location.
[121] See, e.g., People
v. Avila, 770 P.2d 1330 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (defendant’s deletion
of computerized driving records constitute false alteration of document under
state forgery statute). See also 1999 Revision of the Model State
Computer Crimes Code § 6.01.1, available at this location.
[122] See, e.g.,N.Y.
Penal § 170.00 (McKinney 1999), available
at this location
:
Forgery;
definition of terms
1. `Written instrument’ means any
instrument or article, including computer data or a computer program,
containing written or printed matter or the equivalent thereof, used for the
purpose of reciting, embodying, conveying or recording information, or
constituting a symbol or evidence of value, right, privilege or identification,
which is capable of being used to the advantage or disadvantage of some person.
. . .4. `Falsely make.’ A person `falsely makes’ a written instrument when he
makes or draws a complete written instrument in its entirety, or an incomplete
written instrument, which purports to be an authentic creation of its ostensible
maker or drawer, but which is not such either because the ostensible maker or
drawer is fictitious or because, if real, he did not authorize the making or
drawing thereof.
5. `Falsely complete.’ A person
`falsely completes’ a written instrument when, by adding, inserting or changing
matter, he transforms an incomplete written instrument into a complete one,
without the authority of anyone entitled to grant it, so that such complete
instrument appears or purports to be in all respects an authentic creation of
or fully authorized by its ostensible maker or drawer.
6. `Falsely alter.’ A person
`falsely alters’ a written instrument when, without the authority of anyone
entitled to grant it, he changes a written instrument, whether it be in
complete or incomplete form, by means of erasure, obliteration, deletion,
insertion of new matter, transposition of matter, or in any other manner, so
that such instrument in its thus altered form appears or purports to be in all
respects an authentic creation of or fully authorized by its ostensible maker
or drawer.
7. `Forged instrument’ means a
written instrument which has been falsely made, completed or altered.
See also Va.
Code § 18.2-152.14, available at this location. (“The creation, alteration, or deletion of
any computer data contained in any computer or computer network, which if done
on a tangible document or instrument would constitute forgery under art. 1 (§§ 18.2-168
et seq.) of Ch. 6 of this Title, will also be deemed to be forgery”); W. Va.
Code § 61-3C-15 (same).
[125] See, e.g.,mo.
Ann. Stat. § 573.010(5).
[126] See, e.g.,Cal.
Penal § 311.11(a):
Every person who knowingly
possesses or controls any matter, representation of information, data, or
image, including, but not limited to, any film, filmstrip, photograph,
negative, slide, photocopy, videotape, video laser disc, computer hardware,
computer software, computer floppy disc, data storage media, CD-ROM, or
computer-generated equipment or any other computer- generated image that
contains or incorporates in any manner, any film or filmstrip, the production
of which involves the use of a person under the age of 18 years, knowing that
the matter depicts a person under the age of 18 years personally engaging in or
simulating sexual conduct, as defined in subdivision (d) of Section 311.4, is
guilty of a public offense and shall be punished by imprisonment in the county
jail for up to one year, or by a fine not exceeding two thousand five hundred
dollars ($2,500), or by both the fine and imprisonment.
[129] See, e.g., Wayne Petherick, Cyber-Stalking: Obsessional Pursuit and the Digital
Criminal, The Crime Library, at this location (cyber-stalking is “an extension” of “real world”
stalking in which “electronic mediums such as the Internet” are used to
“pursue, harass or contact another in an unsolicited fashion”). See i-safe
America, Cyber Stalking, at this location:
Cyber stalking is characterized by
a person feeling followed and pursued; their privacy is invaded, their every
move watched. It is a very intense form of harassment, and can disrupt the life
of the victim and leave them feeling very afraid.
See also U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Cyberstalking: A New Challenge for Law Enforcement
and Industry (August 1999), available
at this location.
[130] See, e.g., CyberAngels, Policy Concerns About Cyberspace Stalking,
at this location. See also U.S.
Dep’t. of Justice, Cyberstalking: A
New Challenge for Law Enforcement and Industry (August 1999), at this location.
[131] See § II, supra. See also
1999 Revision of Model State Computer Crimes Code § 2.02.2 - Commentary, available at this location; CyberAngels, Policy Concerns About Cyberspace Stalking,
at this location.
[132] See 1999 Revision of Model State
Computer Crimes Code § 2.02.2 - Commentary, at this location.
[133] See, e.g., Petherick, supra note 130, at this location. See also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Cyberstalking: A New Challenge for Law Enforcement
and Industry (August 1999), available at this location:
A cyberstalker may send repeated, threatening, or
harassing messages by the simple push of a button; . . . cyberstalkers use
programs to send messages at regular or random intervals without being physically
present at the computer terminal. California law enforcement authorities say
they have encountered situations where a victim repeatedly receives the message
`187' on their pagers - the section of the California Penal Code for murder. In
addition, a cyberstalker can dupe other Internet users into harassing or
threatening a victim by utilizing Internet bulletin boards or chat rooms. For
example, a stalker may post a controversial or enticing message on the board
under the name, phone number, or e-mail address of the victim, resulting in
subsequent responses being sent to the victim. Each message -- whether from the
actual cyberstalker or others -- will have the intended effect on the victim,
but the cyberstalker's effort is minimal and the lack of direct contact between
the cyberstalker and the victim can make it difficult for law enforcement to
identify, locate, and arrest the offender.
[134] See, e.g., CyberAngels, supra note 131, at this location. See also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Cyberstalking: A New Challenge for Law Enforcement
and Industry, supra note 130, available
at this location.
[135] See § II, supra. See also CyberAngels, Policy Concerns About Cyberspace Stalking,
supra note 131, at this location.
[136] Cyber-stalking
can be a prelude to “real world” stalking, with the stalker first using the
Internet to harass and intimidate his victim and then starting to follow and/or
threaten her in person. See, e.g.,U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Cyberstalking:
A New Challenge for Law Enforcement and Industry, supra note 130, available at this location.
[137] See CyberAngels, supra note 131, at this location (“By definition a stalker online is not following you physically - they are
stalking you electronically”). See alsoU.S. Dep’t of Justice, Cyberstalking: A New Challenge for Law Enforcement
and Industry, supra note 130, available at this location.
[139] See, e.g., 1999 Revision of Model State
Computer Crimes Code § 2.02.2 - Commentary, available
at this location.
[140] See U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Cyberstalking:
A New Challenge for Law Enforcement and Industry, supra note 130, available at this location.
[141] See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Cyberstalking: A New Challenge for Law Enforcement
and Industry, supra
note 130, available at this location:
As a result of the breadth of
conduct potentially involved in stalking, anti-stalking statutes need to be
relatively broad to be effective. At the same time, however, because of that
breadth and because stalking can involve expressive conduct and speech,
anti-stalking statutes must be carefully formulated and enforced so as not to
impinge upon speech that is protected by the First Amendment. This is
particularly true with regard to cyberstalking laws, which frequently will
involve speech over the Internet. The Internet, moreover, has been recognized
as an important tool for protected speech activities. See, e.g., Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,
521 U.S. 844, 850-52, 870 (1997); American
Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 31 F.Supp.2d 473, 476, 493 (E.D. Pa.
1999).
[142] See 1998 Model State Computer Crimes
Code §§ 2.02 & 2.03. Given the complexity of the conduct at
issue, it may be necessary to have a cyber-stalking offense plus other, lesser
offenses, as is illustrated by the two following model statutes:
§ 2.03.1
Stalking
One is guilty
the criminal intentional stalking another when:
(A) An
individual intentionally and repeatedly acts, via a computer, in a manner which
would make a reasonable person:
(1) Fear
for the safety of himself or his family OR
(2) Fear
that the individual's actions will cause the death of the complainant and/or
his loved ones.
(B) This
offense is a third degree felony with penalties pursuant to §§ 1.05(B)(1)(c).
The words used
have the following meanings unless context indicates otherwise.
(1)
Repeatedly means the actions occurred on more than two occasions.
(2) Fear
is severe anxiety related to the actions of another. Whether fear
actually resulted will be determined by using the reasonable person standard
unless the alleged stalker knows or understands that his/her intended victim is
particularly susceptible to fear certain acts a reasonable person would not.
(3) Via
a computer entails any communication made by using a computer, Internet service
provider, table-top Web TV instrument, or any such similar device which can
access otherwise restricted personal or business data.
(4)
Internet is more specifically defined under §§ 1.07(A)(23).
1998
Model State Computer Crimes Code § 2.03.1, available
at this location.
§ 2.02.3
Malicious Infliction of Emotional Distress utilizing Computer Communication
(A) A person
commits the crime of malicious infliction of emotional distress utilizing
computerized communication when a person utilizes a computer, computer network,
computerized communications system, or the Internet, as those terms are defined
in section 1.05 of this Code, to:
(1)
knowingly, with a malicious purpose, send messages that threaten to cause
physical injury or property damage to any person and the messages are of such
an outrageous content or nature as to cause severe emotional or mental distress
to the recipient; and/or
(2)
knowingly, with a malicious purpose, and with the reasonable expectation that
the intended recipient will receive them, send messages which the sender
threatens to cause physical injury or property damage to the recipient, the
recipient's family or to the recipient's property and that the content of these
messages is of such an outrageous or nature as to cause severe emotional or
mental distress to the recipient; and/or
(3)
knowingly, with a malicious purpose, and with the reasonable expectation that
the intended recipient will receive them, send messages that contain obscene,
lewd, vulgar, or profane language as measured by relevant community standards,
the content of which is sufficiently outrageous as to cause severe emotional or
mental distress to the recipient; and/or
(4)
knowingly, with a malicious purpose, send a message containing the frightening,
intimidating, threatening, abusive, or alarming content which is sent
repeatedly to the intended recipient and which causes the recipient severe
emotional distress.
(B) Anyone
violating any provisions of this section shall be guilty of malicious
infliction of emotional distress, a misdemeanor of the second degree.
(C) Any
subsequent offense under this section shall be a felony of the fourth degree.
(D) If the
victim or intended victim of the offense is a child under the age of eighteen
years, the perpetrator shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree.
(E) Nothing in
this statutory section bars the victim from bringing a civil action seeking to
recover damages under this provision.
1998
Model State Computer Crimes Code § 2.02.3, available
at this location.
[143] See 1999 Revision of Model State
Computer Crimes Code §§ 2.02 & 2.03, available
at this location.
2.02.2 Online Harassment, Threats
and Non‑Sexual Stalking ‑‑ Prohibited Activities
(A) It shall be unlawful for any
individual or group of individuals through a pattern of computerized
communication to engage in harassing, threatening or stalking any person or
group of persons via a computer.
(1) A `Pattern of Computerized
Communication’ [PCC] requires the overt act of a person or group of persons
being on a computer and consists of the following predicate crimes, of which a
violation of only one constitutes a Pattern of Computerized Communication:
(a) Harassment, §2.02.2 (B)
(b) Threats, §2.02.2 (C)
(c) Non‑Sexual Stalking,
§2.02.2 (D)
(d) Intimidation, §2.02.2 (E )
(e) Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress, §2.02.2 (F)
(B) A person or group of persons
commit the crime of harassment when he/she uses electronic communications for
any of the following purposes:
(1) making any comment, request,
suggestion or proposal which is obscene with an intent to offend and/or
(2) transmitting to any person,
with the intent to harass and regardless of whether the communication is read
in its entirety or at all, any file, document, or other communication which
prevents that person from using his or her telephone service or electronic
communications device and/or
(3) transmitting, for no
legitimate purpose, a message which contained frightening, intimidating,
abusive, or alarming content and resulted in repeated harassment of the
recipient by other subsequent readers of the message.
(C) A person's or group of
persons' speech constitutes a "true threat," when
(1) the following elements are
met:
(a) a person makes a statement
[which he/she knowingly or purposely transmits to someone and], in context, a
reasonable recipient of the communications would interpret [it] as
communicating a serious expression of an intent to inflict or cause serious
harm on or to the recipient and
(b) the person intended that the
statement be taken as a threat that would serve to place the recipient in fear
for his/her personal safety, regardless of whether the person actually intended
to carry out the threat.
(2) True Threats are not protected
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
(D) A person or group of persons
commits the crime of non‑sexual stalking when:
(1) without lawful authority, a
person or group of persons, willfully or maliciously engages in a course of
conduct that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened,
intimidated or harassed and
(2) with the intent to place the
reasonable person to fear for his/her safety, or the safety of his/her
immediate family and
(3) all of which actually causes
the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated or harassed.
(E) A person or group of persons
commits the crime of intimidation when he/she purposely sends a message or
messages with materially fraudulent information in an attempt to hinder,
discourage, encourage, or otherwise influence the recipient's behavior.
(F) A person or group of persons
commits the crime of intentional infliction of emotional distress when a person
or group of person acts either purposely, knowingly, or recklessly.
(1) Degrees of Culpability:
(a) A person or group of persons
acts purposely when he/she has a conscious object to engage in a type of
conduct and has knowledge that such a type of conduct will cause such a result
(b) A person or group of persons
acts knowingly when he/she is aware of his/her conduct and is practically
certain that his/her conduct will cause such a result.
(c) A person of group of persons
acts recklessly when he/she consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his/her
conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the
nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him,
its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a
law‑abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.
(2) Elements necessary to
establish a prima facie case of the crime of intentional infliction of emotional
distress depends on whether a person or group of persons:
(a) sends a message or messages
that threaten to cause physical injury or property damage to any person and the
messages are of such an outrageous content or nature as to cause severe emotional
or mental distress to the recipient; and/or
(b) sends a message or messages
that threatens to cause physical injury or property damage to the recipient,
the recipient's family or to the recipient's property and that the content of
these messages is of such an outrageous nature as to cause severe emotional or
mental distress to the recipient; and/or
(c) sends a message or messages
that contain obscene, lewd, vulgar, or profane language as measured by
constitutional standards, the content of which is sufficiently outrageous as to
cause severe emotional or mental distress to the recipient; and/or
(d) sends a message or messages
containing the frightening, intimidating, threatening, abusive, or alarming
content which is sent repeatedly to the intended recipient and which causes the
recipient severe emotional distress.
1999 Revision of the Model State
Computer Crimes Code § 2.02, available at this location.
[144] See, e.g., Darnell v. State, 72 Tex. Crim.
271, 161 S.W. 971 (Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 1913) (1909 statute making
it a crime to use “vulgar, profane, obscene or indecent language over or
through any telephone”).
[149] As
explained above, “property” can be defined to include computer programs, data,
computer services and other commodities that can attract the attention of
cyber-vandals.
[151] See, e.g., 1999 Revision of Model State
Computer Crimes Code, Article IV, available
at this location.
[152] See, e.g., Julian Dibbell, Viruses Are Good For You, Wired (February
1995), available at this location.
[154] See, e.g., 1999 Revision of Model State
Computer Crimes Code § 4.02.1, available at this location.
[156] See section (1), above, which
discusses theft. For the reasons given
above, a denial of services attack does not constitute a theft of
property; the perpetrator does not even
attempt to transfer property, in whatever form, from the victim’s web site to
his or her own possession. The goal is
simply to shut down the web site’s ability to function.
[157] See, e.g., Richard Power, Computer Security
Institute: Tough Questions on ISP Security,
available at this location.
[158] See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Siderius, Insurance for Electronic Data Risks: An Idea Whose
Time Has Come?, at this location.
[160] See supra
§ II. See, e.g., Swanagan v. State, 2000 WL 137147 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000); People v. Rhorer, 967 P.2d 147
(Colo. 1998). Cf. State v. Crawford, 737 A.2d 366 (Vt.
1999) (under Vermont statute, criminal trespass is not a lesser-included
offense of burglary, since criminal
trespass requires proof defendant entered a “dwelling house,” while burglary
merely requires proof that he/she entered a building).
[165] See, e.g., “Hacker,” Webopedia, at this location. See also sams.net, Maximum
Security: A Hacker’s Guide to Protecting Your Internet Site and Network,
at this location:
A hacker
is a person intensely interested in the arcane and recondite workings of any
computer operating system. Most often, hackers are programmers. As such,
hackers obtain advanced knowledge of operating systems and programming
languages. They may know of holes within systems and the reasons for such
holes. Hackers constantly seek further knowledge, freely share what they have
discovered, and never, ever intentionally damage data.
Of course, as
computer security expert Donn Parker correctly points out, when a hacker
“breaks into” a computer system, there is no physical trespass in the “real
world” sense:
. . . access a computer, gain
entry into a computer, break into a computer, ...once inside a computer,
residing therein. These terms are common and generally accepted computer lingo.
However, they are incorrect, and this is especially dangerous for the purposes
of the law. All of these terms actually mean using a computer, making a
computer perform or function or execute instructions. Certain instructions can
be executed in a computer in such a way that only certain instructions
specified will be executed in the future, e.g., gaining control of a computer.
. . .
. . . .
Being in a computer or accessing a
computer should mean physically crawling inside, and different from using one.
Email from Donn Parker to Susan
Brenner (March 16, 2000, on file with the editors). Mr. Parker agrees, though, with the argument developed above,
e.g., that physical trespass and hacking are sufficiently analogous to permit
the use of trespass laws against hackers.
See email from Donn Parker
to Susan Brenner (March 17, 2000, on file with the editors) (for the purposes
of imposing liability for criminal trespass, “use or control” of another’s property
analogous to “incursion into or onto” another’s property).
[166] See, e.g., “Crack,” Webopedia, at this location. See generally “Cracker,” The
Jargon File, at this location. See also sams.net, Maximum
Security: A Hacker’s Guide to Protecting Your Internet Site and Network,
at this location:
A cracker
is a person who breaks into or otherwise violates the system integrity of
remote machines, with malicious intent. Crackers, having gained unauthorized
access, destroy vital data, deny legitimate users service, or basically cause
problems for their targets. Crackers can easily be identified because their
actions are malicious.
[167] See, e.g., Indiana Statutes § 35-43-2-3(b):
A person who knowingly or
intentionally accesses:
(1) a computer system;(2) a
computer network; or (3) any part of a computer system or computer network;
without the consent of the owner of the computer system or computer network, or
the consent of the owner's licensee,
commits computer trespass, a Class A misdemeanor.
[176] E.g., Jane Doe and Richard Roe agree,
via email, that they will break into Corporation X’s computer system.
[177] E.g., Jane Doe and Richard Roe meet
face to face and agree that they will break into Corporation X’s computer
system.
[178] E.g., Jane Doe and Richard Roe
agree–after a series of face to face conversations and email exchanges—that
they will break into Corporation Y’s
computer system.
[179] See, e.g., State v. Bridges,
925 P.2d 357
(Haw. 1996) (conspiratorial agreement renewed via telephone call).
[180] E.g., Jane Doe and Richard Roe meet face
to face and agree that they will break into Corporation Y’s computer system.
[181] E.g., Jane Doe and Richard Roe agree, via
email, that they will break into Corporation Y’s
computer system.
[182] E.g., Jane Doe and Richard Roe
agree–after a series of face-to-face conversations and email exchanges that
they will break into Corporation X’s computer system.
[183] See generally U.S. v. Holveck , 867 F.Supp. 969
(D. Kan. 1994) (defendant used telephone to solicit agent he believed to be
hitman).
[184] See, e.g., State v. Coyazo, 936 P.2d 882
(N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (defendant used telephone calls to solicit perjury).
[187] See 1999 Revision of the Model State
Computer Crimes Code, Commentary to § 8.08 (1999), at this location. See,
e.g., Winn Schwartau, Cyber-vigilantes
Hunt Down Hackers (Jan. 12, 1999), at this location; See also Asahi Shimbun, Cyber Vigilantes:
Victims Take Law Into Own Hands, Asahi News (Jan. 23, 2001), available
at this location.
[188] See, e.g., M.E. Kabay & Lawrence M.
Walsh, The Year in Computer Crime,
Information Security (Dec. 2000),
at this location.
[190] This is
true regardless of whether cybervigilantes limit their activities to cyberspace
or venture into the real world to pursue those whom they see as offenders. See,
e.g., Winn Schwartau, Cyber-vigilantes
Hunt Down Hackers (Jan. 12, 1999), at this location. See also
Asahi Shimbun, Cyber Vigilantes: Victims Take Law Into Own Hands, Asahi News (Jan. 23, 2001), available at this location.
[191] See, e.g., Picketing Online, The Hindu (Jan. 5, 2001), at this location:
`Hacktivists’ are different from
`hackers’ in the sense that unlike the latter, they are not in the business of
sending malicious mail or playing practical jokes on other netizens. They are
politically committed people - academics, professionals, students - who have
chosen the net to raise issues which worry them. Their methods are targeted
against corporate monopolies, racist groups and the new global order which they
think breeds social and economic inequities. `Hacktivism’ is also deployed to
raise issues relating to freedom of expression, the increasingly `repressive’
power of the State, and environment. It is a broad agenda of social and
political issues which is sought to be pursued through `technological’ means.
[192] See, e.g., Deborah Radcliff, Meet the Hactivist, Computerworld 52 (Oct. 16, 2000), available at this location:
`The government tries to put
electronic activism into the peg of cyberterrorism and crime with its Infowar
eulogies. But E-Hippies, cDc and others aren't criminals. The Internet just
multiplies our voice,’ says Ricardo Dominguez, who edits a Zapatista
revolutionary publication and operates the Electronic Disturbance Theater
(www.thing.net/rdom).
[193] Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and
Related Agencies,(Feb. 16, 2000) (Testimony of
Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation), available at this location:
Recently we have seen a rise in
what has been dubbed `hacktivism’—politically motivated attacks on publicly
accessible web pages or e-mail servers. These groups and individuals overload
e-mail servers and hack into web sites to send a political message. While these
attacks generally have not altered operating systems or networks, they still
damage services and deny the public access to websites containing valuable
information and infringe on others' rights to communicate. One such group is
called the `Electronic Disturbance Theater,’ which promotes civil disobedience
on-line in support of its political agenda regarding the Zapatista movement in
Mexico and other issues. This past spring they called for worldwide electronic
civil disobedience and have taken what they term "protest actions"
against White House and Department of Defense servers. . . .
[194] See, e.g., Picketing Online, The Hindu,
Jan. 5, 2001 (“tactics range from clogging the `enemy’ websites with messages
to diverting their traffic to other sites, in one case . . . people seeking the
Ku Klux Klan site were directed to hatewatch.org site instead. Often the
targeted sites are defaced or they are inundated with access requests thus
slowing down the speed of the server or even sending it crashing”). See also
Sarah Ferguson, Overloading Big Brother,
VillageVoice 35, Oct. 26, 1999 (hactivist plans to overload the
Echelon surveillance system). Hacktivists
have also used computer viruses, worms and other malicious code to disseminate
their messages and/or damage sites the activities of which they condemn. See,
e.g., Dorothy Denning, Activism,
Hacktivism and Cyberterrorism: The Internet as a Tool for Influencing Foreign
Policy, available at
this location.
[195] See supra § II. Here is one definition of cyberterrorism,
which builds on the FBI’s definition of terrorism:
The FBI defines terrorism as `the
unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in
furtherance of political or social objectives.’
For cyberterrorism, [Barry] Collin
adds to the definition `. . . through
the exploitation of systems deployed by the target. While all other forms of
terrorism . . . require the “black hat’’ to deliver and deploy a weapon of some
kind, cyberterrorism leverages the high-technology systems we put in place.’
Amara D. Angelica, The New Face of War, Tech Week, Nov. 2, 1998, at this location. See also
Matt Overholt, Introduction to
Cyberterrorism, at this location.
[197] Cyber-terrorism
statutes are rare so far. While this
West Virginia statute does not use the terms “terrorism” or “terrorist,” and
while it does not incorporate the premise that the actions are taken to advance
a political agenda, it is clearly directed at cyberterrorism:
Any person who accesses a computer
or computer network and knowingly, willfully and without authorization (a)
interrupts or impairs the providing of services by any private or public
utility; (b) interrupts or impairs the providing of any medical services; (c)
interrupts or impairs the providing of services by any state, county or local
government agency, public carrier or public communication service; or otherwise
endangers public safety shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be fined not more than fifty thousand dollars or imprisoned not
more than twenty years, or both.
W. Va.
Code § 61-3C-14. See also 1999 Revision of the Model State
Computer Crimes Code § 8.07 (1999), available
at this location.
[199] For more
on LambdaMOO, see, e.g., Jennifer
L. Mnookin, Virtual(ly) Law: The Emergence
of Law in LambdaMOO, 2 J.
Computer-Mediated Comm. 1 (June 1996), at this location
[200] “Virtual
rape” Rape conducted in virtual space, through words or text instead of by
physical force.” Cyberspace Glossary, at this location.
[201] See, e.g., Julian Dibbell, My Dinner with Catherine MacKinnon (Apr.
21, 1996), at this location;
Richard MacKinnon, Virtual Rape, 2 J. Computer-Mediated Comm. 4 (Mar.
1997), at this location.
[205] Mr.
Bungle’s character could be annihilated, or “toaded,” by entering a command
into the LambdaMOO program that would erase the description and attributes of
his character and delete his user account.
See id.
[208] See, e.g., 1999 Revision of Model State
Computer Crimes Code, § 3.04.1 (1999), available
at this location
(describing steps LambdaMOO subsequently took to deal with possibility of
virtual rape). See also Jennifer L. Mnookin, Virtual(ly) Law: The Emergence of Law in LambdaMOO,2 J.
Computer-Mediated Comm. 1 (June 1996), at this location.
See
generally Julian Dibbell, My
Dinner with Catherine MacKinnon, at this location.
[209] See Julian Dibbell, My Dinner with Catherine MacKinnon, at this location; Richard
MacKinnon, Virtual Rape, Journal
of Computer-Mediated Communication, at this location;
See also1999 Revision of Model
State Computer Crimes Code, § 3.04.1, at this location.
[210] See, e.g.,Cal. Penal § 261:
(a) Rape is an act of sexual
intercourse accomplished with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator, under
any of the following circumstances:
(1) Where a person is incapable,
because of a mental disorder or developmental or physical disability, of giving
legal consent, and this is known or reasonably should be known to the person
committing the act. . . .(2) Where it is accomplished against a person's will
by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful
bodily injury on the person or another.(3) Where a person is prevented from
resisting by any intoxicating or anesthetic substance, or any controlled
substance, and this condition was known, or reasonably should have been known
by the accused.(4) Where a person is at the time unconscious of the nature of
the act, and this is known to the accused. . . . (5) Where a person submits under
the belief that the person committing the act is the victim's spouse, and this
belief is induced by any artifice, pretense, or concealment practiced by the
accused, with intent to induce the belief.(6) Where the act is accomplished
against the victim's will by threatening to retaliate in the future against the
victim or any other person . . . .(7) Where the act is accomplished against the
victim's will by threatening to use the authority of a public official to
incarcerate, arrest, or deport the victim or another, and the victim has a
reasonable belief that the perpetrator is a public official. . . .
[213] See, e.g., Richard MacKinnon, Virtual Rape, 2 J. Computer-Mediated Comm. 4 (Mar. 1997), at this location.
[217] See, e.g., Richard MacKinnon, Virtual Rape, 2 J. Computer-Mediated Comm. 4 (Mar. 1997), at this location.
[219] See, e.g. Columbia Natural Resources, Inc.,
v. Tatum, 1995 Fed App. 0203P (6th Cir.), available at this location:
The due process clause of the
Constitution provides the foundation for the void for vagueness doctrine. . . .
From the earliest cases to hold that a statute was unconstitutionally vague . .
. to the present, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the vagueness
doctrine has two primary goals. First,
to ensure fair notice to the citizenry; second, to provide standards for
enforcement by the police, judges, and juries.
The requirement that the government
write statutes that provide fair notice to those who must obey them is a
traditional basis of the vagueness doctrine. `A statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,
violates the first essential of due process of law.’ Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1925). .
. .
The second concern, that of minimal
enforcement standards, is related to the first. While the first involves notice
to those charged with obeying the law, the second part relates to notice to
those who must enforce the law, be they the police, judges, or juries. The
standards of enforcement must be precise enough to avoid `involving so many
factors of varying effect that neither the person to decide in advance nor the
jury after the fact can safely and certainly judge the result.’ Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445,
465 (1927).
See also FindLaw, Clarity in Criminal Statutes: The Void for Vagueness
Doctrine, at Cline v. Frink Dairy Co.
[220] See supra
§ III. (Cybercrimes: Crime Analogues?).
[222] See, e.g., Darnell v. State, 72 Tex. Crim.
271, 161 S.W. 971 (Tex. Crim. App. 1913) (statute making it a crime to use
“vulgar, profane, obscene or indecent language over or through any telephone”
passed in 1909).
[226] If we
parse the “thought crime” of imagining the death of the king into the four
constituent elements Anglo-American law currently uses to impose criminal
liability, we arrive at this result:
actus reus: The
perpetrator imagines that the kind dies.
mens rea: The
perpetrator purposely imagines that the king dies.
attendant
circumstances: The perpetrator is aware of the
kind and is able to formulate thoughts in which the king dies.
harm: The
perpetrator successfully imagines the king’s death.
Every one of these elements occurs
only in the perpetrator’s mind; none has any effect in the external, real
world. One might argue that indulging
in thoughts of the king’s death is likely to dispose someone to act on those
thoughts, ultimately, but that possibility is not encompassed by the definition
of this offense; this offense is completed once the offender has successfully
imagined the king’s death.
[227] W.
Blackstone, IV Commentaries on the laws of
England: Of Public Wrongs 56. See also R. v. Duncan and Others,
[1944] 2 All ER 220 (Court of Criminal Appeal, England); Witchcraft Act of 1735
(repealed 1951).
[228] See W. Blackstone, IV Commentaries on the laws of England: Of Public
Wrongs 56.
[230] But see Zamfara State of Nigeria, Shari’ah Penal Code Law § 406 (January
2000), at this location:
Whoever:-
(a) by his statement or actions represent himself to be a
witch or to have the power of witchcraft; or
(b) accuses or threatens to accuse any person with being a
witch or with having the power of witchcraft; or
(c) makes or sells or uses or has in his possession or
represents himself to be in possession of any juju, drug or charm which is
intended lobe used or reported to possess the power to prevent or delay any
person from doing an act which such person from doing an act which such person
has a legal right to do, or to compel any person has a legal right to refrain
from doing or which is alleged or reported to possess the power of causing any
natural phenomenon or any disease or epidemic; or
(d) presides at or is present at or takes part in the worship
or invocation of any juju which has been declared unlawful under the provisions
of section 405; or
(e) is in possession of or has control over any human remains
which are used or are intended to be used in connection with the worship or
invocation of any juju; or
(f) makes or uses or assists in making or using or has in his
possession any thing whatsoever the making, use, or possession of which has
been declared unlawful under the provisions of section 405 shall be punished
with death.
[232] See, e.g., Email from Donn Parker to Susan
Brenner (March 17, 2000 - on file with the editors) (social policy justifies
“having special cybercrime laws”, if only “to directly confront potential
perpetrators with the criminalty of their planned
acts as deterrents”).
[233] See, e.g., Accused California Serial Killer Convicted,
(Feb. 24, 1999), available at this location. See also
Susan W. Brenner, RICO, CCE, And Other
Complex Crimes: The Transformation of
American Law?, 2 Wm. &
Mary Bill Rts. J. 239, 243-244 (1993). The same is true for terrorism
prosecutions. See, e.g., U.S. v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp.
2d 189, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (terrorists responsible for bombing U.S. embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania charged with 223 counts of murder).
[234] See, e.g., U.S. v. Smith, 231 F.3d 800, 815
n. 16 (11th Cir. 2000) (“With the purchase and sale of securities, a
single document, such as a prospectus, is mailed to thousands of shareholders,
which raises the specter of thousands of counts”). See also U.S. v.
Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 677 F. Supp. 117, 119 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (indictment
charged 8 defendants with “400 various counts” which would involve “in excess
of two and one-half thousand counts to be resolved with respect to all
defendants).
[235] This is,
for example, done in sentencing under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See,
e.g., U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 U.S.S.G. (magnitude of loss a factor used to
increase the offense level in sentencing for theft); § 2F1.1 (magnitude of loss
a factor used to increase the offense level in sentencing for fraud and
forgery); U.S.S.G. § 2N1.1 (magnitude of loss a factor used to increase the
offense level in sentencing for tampering with consumer products).
[236] See, e.g., 1999 Revision of Model State Computer Crime Code, Commentary to § 5.01.5:
Because it may be easier to
embezzle funds using a computer than it would be without a computer, the
drafters of the revision recommend making such use of a computer an aggravating
factor under existing embezzlement statutes. For example, Ohio’s criminal
prohibition against tampering with records distinguishes between acts involving
data or computer software, as well as tailoring the punishment of the crime to
the value of the data or computer software that was lost:
§ 2913.42
Tampering with records.
(B)(1) Whoever
violates this section is guilty of tampering with public records.
(2) Except as
provided in division (B)(4) of this section, if the offense does not involve
data or computer software, tampering with records is whichever of the following
is applicable...
(3) Except as
provided in division (B)(4) of this section, if the offense involves a
violation of division (A) of this section involving data or computer software,
tampering with records is whichever of the following is applicable:
(a) Except as
otherwise provided in division (B)(3)(b), (c), or (d) of this section, a
misdemeanor of the first degree;
(b) If the
value of the data or computer software involved in the offense of the loss to
the victim is five hundred dollars or more and is less than give thousand
dollars, a felony of the fifth degree;
(c) If the
value of the data or computer software involved in the offense or the loss to
the victim is five thousand dollars or more and is les than one hundred
thousand dollars, a felony of the fourth degree;
(d) If the
value of the data or computer software involved in the offense or the loss to
the victim is one hundred thousand dollars or more or if the offense is
committed for the purpose of devising a scheme to defraud or to obtain property
or services and the value of the property or services or the loss to the victim
is five thousand dollars or more, a felony of the third degree.
(4) if the
writing, data, computer software, or record is kept by or belongs to a local,
state, or federal government entity, a felony of the third degree.
. . . .
Ohio’’s willingness to examine the factual circumstances surrounding different
methods of committing the same criminal act sets a good example for states’
recognition of the fact that computers make crimes easier to commit without
changing the essential elements of the crime itself. With or without a
computer, the violation of a position of trust is the essence of the crime of
embezzlement. Therefore, as with §§ 5.01.1, 5.01.2, and 5.01.3 of the revision,
the drafters recommend that, at maximum, states considering a new, separate
statute for the prohibition of embezzlement consider instead making the use of
a computer to embezzle funds an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes.
[238] Indeed,
the Supreme Court has resisted efforts to use this as a basis for imposing
criminal liability, at least in the context of criminal conspiracy. See,
e.g., Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 405-06 (1957) (“the
acts of covering up can by themselves
indicate nothing more than that the conspirators do not wish to be
apprehended--a concomitant, certainly, of every crime since Cain attempted to
conceal the murder of Abel from the Lord”).
[239] See, e.g., Council of Europe, Draft
Convention on Cyber-Crime (Draft 25), Art. 23 (jurisdiction over cybercrimes)
& Art. 26-34 (mutual assistance in investigating cybercrimes and
apprehending perpetrators), available at this location. It is also possible to make this a favor in
sentencing: The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, for example, require that courts take a perpetrator’s efforts “to
avoid detection or responsibility” for an offense into account in determining
sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1).
[240] See, e.g., Email from Donn Parker to Susan
Brenner (March 17, 2000 - on file with the editors) (social policy justifies
“having special cybercrime laws”, if only “to directly confront potential
perpetrators with the criminalty of their planned
acts as deterrents”).
[241] See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual
Property Laws: A Psychological Perspective, 29
N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol.
219, 222-23 (1996-97).
[S]tudies of deterrence suggest
that estimates of the probability of being caught and punished only have an
effect above a certain threshold level of risk. In typical crime-related
situations, however, objective risks are often quite low. For example, the
objective risk of being caught, convicted, and imprisoned for rape is twelve
percent, for robbery, four percent, and for assault, burglary, larceny, and
motor vehicle theft, one percent. Of course the psychological estimates of risk
are the key to behavioral decisions—and research suggests that they are
frequently lower than actual risks. . . .
A second problem is structural.
People have greater opportunities to break rules in certain situations. For
example, people who are self-employed have greater opportunities to cheat on
their taxes than people whose income is primarily in the form of wages. . . .
In other words, there may be
settings in which deterrence is an effective strategy. For example, in cases of
homicide, the police catch, convict, and imprison forty-five percent of
offenders—a risk high enough to produce a deterrence effect. Presumably this
high rate of clearance reflects the large number of resources that society is
willing to devote to resolving murders. Similarly, people whose income is
primarily wages have little opportunity to cheat on their taxes. Deterrence is
thus more likely to work in these settings.
Id. (notes
omitted).
[242] See Marc D. Goodman, Why the Police Don’t Care About Computer Crime,
10 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 465 §
II (1997), at this location.
Simply stated, computer crime is
not a priority for police departments around the world. In a time when greater
and greater emphasis is being placed on issues like violent crime reduction and
community-based policing, the detection and investigation of computer-related
offenses remains an elusive goal. When asked about the lack of serious progress
in the fight against computer crime, police executives almost unanimously cite
`money, money, money’ as the principal impediment. However, the true reasons for law enforcement's lackadaisical
approach to handling digital crime are much more complex and enigmatic.
Computer crime has been recognized
as an enforcement dilemma for at least two decades, yet the majority of police
agencies seem unconcerned with its presence or effects. Although some strides
to investigate and prosecute such crimes have been made recently, the
challenges facing the police in their struggle to catch up with the hackers,
crackers, and crypto-anarchists of the digital world remain formidable. Despite
the recent increase of technology-related crime, 72% of police departments and
88% of sheriff's departments do not have units that specialize in the area. . .
.
Before the public, the business
world, and policymakers can begin to change the current state of affairs, they
must first understand why the police do not seem to care about digital crime.
Some of the reasons include: police culture itself, the invisibility of digital
crime, the difficulty in investigating high-tech crime, an abundance of `real
crime,’ a lack of public outcry on the subject, and the high cost of computer
training and specialized units.
Id. (notes
omitted). See also, Law Officials
Lack Resources To Fight Internet Crime,NUA Internet Surveys, Dec. 13, 2000, at
this location:
According to research from Gartner
Group, criminals in the US can exploit the Internet with little fear of being
caught, as law-enforcement agencies receive little funding to address
cybercrime.
Gartner's research showed that almost all (97 percent)
law-enforcement funding for computer-related crimes is spent on 300 federal
officers, less than 0.1 percent of the country's law-enforcement staff.
Federal spending on law
enforcement is expected to reach USD17 billion by the end of 2000, with only
USD10 million allocated to Internet-related training, staffing, and research.
Gartner predicts that funding to combat cybercrime will not exceed 1 percent of
the total law-enforcement budget for the next four years. During that period,
the economic value of cybercrime is expected to increase by 1000 percent.
[244] This
could consist of an analogue to the RICO statute, which imposes additive
liability for “enterprise” criminality on the premise that organized criminal
activity inflicts greater “harms” and poses greater dangers than does
traditional, “simple” criminal activity.
See, e.g., Susan W.
Brenner, RICO, CCE, And Other Complex
Crimes: The Transformation of American
Law?, 2 Wm. & Mary Bill
Rts. J. 239, 243-46 (1993).
[245] Email
from Donn Parker to Susan Brenner (March 17, 2000, on file with the editors).
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2001 California Criminal Law Review, All Rights Reserved. Use by Permission.
Pincite using paragraph numbers, e.g. 4 Cal. Crim. Law Rev. 1, ¶11.
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